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Forty acres and a mule. The government broke that promise to African American farmers.
Over one hundred years later, the USDA broke its promise to Mr. James Beverly. It
promised him a loan to build farrowing houses so that he could breed hogs. Because he was
African American, he never received that loan. He lost his farm because of the loan that
never was. Nothing can completely undo the discrimination of the past or restore lost land
or lost opportunities to Mr. Beverly. . . .
3
The story of the federal government’s failure to deliver “forty acres and a mule” to freed slaves
after the Civil War has long been a part of African American folklore. This history has now been
highlighted in an opinion by a federal judge in the landmark settlement of the class action lawsuit
filed by black farmers against the United States Department of Agriculture (“the USDA”). The
history of those individual African Americans who purchased land in states throughout the South
following emancipation, however, remains largely unknown and uncelebrated. In total, this group
acquired approximately 15 million acres of land in the region in the 50 years following the Civil
War. As much as any group of Americans in this nation’s history, these landowners embraced the
republican ideal of the rural smallhold and widely distributed ownership, and believed that only
through such ownership could real economic and political independence be achieved.
4
                                               
1 Revised version of a thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws
(LL.M.) at the University of Wisconsin Law School, 1999.
2 Thomas Mitchell, Assistant Dean, University of Wisconsin Law School, supervises the Summer Extern Program,
a clinical externship run jointly by the Land Tenure Center and the Law School, both at the University of Wisconsin–
Madison. He will join the University of Wisconsin Law School faculty as an assistant professor beginning in August
2000.
3 Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 112 (D.D.C. 1999).
4 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877 109 (1988).2
Unlike the large numbers of poor white men who were able to acquire land from the public
domain under federal homestead laws in the late 1800s, African Americans who acquired land did
so mostly by private market purchases, often in the teeth of threatened violence, limited access to
credit, and overt discrimination.
5 The new group of black landowners who purchased rural land
between 1865 and 1910 generally became owner-operators of farms; consequently, the high-water
mark for black landownership strongly correlates with the high-water mark for the number of
black farmers in the South. By 1920, there were more than 925,000 black farmers in the United
States and one in four black farmers owned the land. Almost all of these black owner-operators
lived in the South.
With the new millennium just on the horizon, the pattern of landownership in the rural African
American community represents the mirror opposite of the trend in black land acquisition100 years
ago at the dawn of the twentieth century. Remarkable levels of acquisition have been replaced by
extraordinary levels of land loss in the past half-century or so. Today, African American farm
owner-operators—whether full- or part-owners—own little more than 2 million acres of land in
the United States.
6 In part this is a trend amongst small farmers of all races and in every region.
The number of small farmers and the acreage under ownership by small farmers have declined
significantly in recent times. Yet land loss in rural African American communities far exceeds
farmland lost by white farmers.
7 Even American Indian landowners—a group whose current land
base represents but a fraction of its ancestral landholdings—have fared better than rural African
American landowners over the past 50 to 60 years.
8
                                               
5 Id. at 376, 403–4; see also LOREN SCHWENINGER, BLACK PROPERTY OWNERS IN THE SOUTH: 1790–1915 145–
6, 148, 151–2 (1990).
6 1 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP’T OF AGRIC., 1997 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, PART 51, UNITED STATES
SUMMARY AND STATE DATA 25 (1997) [hereinafter 1997 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE]. The 1997 census reveals that the
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7 The Minority Farmer: A Disappearing American Resource; Has the Farmers Home Administration Been the
Primary Catalyst?, H.R. REP. NO. 101-984, at 5 (1990) (noting that the difference in the rate of land loss in the 1950s
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H. Harris, Jr., of the Land Loss Prevention Project) [hereinafter Decline of Minority Farming in the United States].
8 In fact, since the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, the American Indian land base held in trust by the federal
government for both Indian tribes and individual American Indians has appeared to increase if one compares the number
of acres held in trust in 1934 with the number of acres the Bureau of Indian Affairs reports that are currently held in trust
for Indian tribes and individual American Indians. In 1934, the federal government held 48 million acres of land in trust
for Indians. See ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW 152 (3
rd ed. 1991). At the end of 1997, the Bureau
of Indian Affairs reported that nearly 56 million acres were held in trust for both tribes and individual American Indians.
BUREAU OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF INTERIOR, 1997 ANNUAL REPORT OF INDIAN LANDS, FORM 5-5425,
<http://doi.gov/bia/realty/report97.html> (the ANNUAL REPORT OF INDIAN LANDS was last officially published by the
Bureau of Indian Affairs in September 1985). According to the 1997 annual report, the most recent such report, the
Bureau of Indian Affairs holds in trust 45,678,161 acres of land for Indian tribes and an additional 10,059,291 acres for
individual Indians.3
Even the USDA has acknowledged that for many farmers, “especially minority and limited-
resource farmers,” land loss has been involuntary.
9 Such involuntary land loss extends to rural,
black landowners generally. This paper focuses on one of the primary causes of involuntary black
land loss in recent times—partition sales of black-owned land held under tenancies in common.
A partition sale can be viewed as a “private” forced sale of land held under concurrent ownership
arrangements, typically the tenancy in common. The combined effect of two sets of legal rules
contribute to the loss of black-owned rural land as a result of partition actions. First, like many
other poor people in this country, rural African American landowners have tended not to make
wills; at the owner’s death, state intestacy rules transfer to a broad class of heirs an interest in real
property of the intestate. Property passed down by intestacy over generations becomes highly
fractionated, splintering the fee into hundreds and even thousands of interests.
Second, the resulting tenancies in common are governed by rules of common ownership that
fail to distribute rights and responsibilities fairly amongst the tenants in common. Any tenant in
common, whether a co-tenant holding a minute interest or a majority interest, may force a sale of
the land, thereby ending the tenancy in common. Any co-tenant may sell their interest to someone
outside of the family or ownership group, bringing a stranger into the common ownership, without
seeking the consent of the other co-tenants. Despite these broad powers, there are no
corresponding obligations to contribute to the ongoing costs of maintaining the property.
In the special case of fractionated heir property, especially as held by poor people, these
distributional problems can be magnified. It may be impossible even for a diligent co-tenant in
possession to obtain contribution from the other co-tenants for the ongoing costs of maintaining
the property. Poor people who own heir property in common are unlikely to have access to
lawyers who can craft sophisticated, private agreements to manage common property in a manner
that fairly distributes rights and responsibilities and ensures continued ownership of the land by the
group. Race compounds this problem as minorities often have less access to legal professionals
than other, similarly situated people in terms of economic class.
10 And where interests are
fractionated, any effort to reach such a private agreement ex post facto involves prohibitive
transactions costs. Simply identifying the other co-tenants who often are dispersed throughout the
country can be impossible.
Opportunistic lawyers or land speculators have taken advantage of these legal rules in order
to acquire black-owned land. Many times, family members know—or learn from an outsider—that
they own an interest in a tenancy in common and decide to cash out. Although some seek legal
                                               
9 CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION TEAM, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., CIVIL RIGHTS AT THE U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. 14 (1997)
[hereinafter the CRAT Report].
10 As the supervisor for the past two years of a clinical externship program run jointly by the Land Tenure Center
of the University of Wisconsin–Madison and the University of Wisconsin Law School, I have observed firsthand the
problem that poor African Americans experience in securing legal representation. Under this externship program, we
have sent law students from the University of Wisconsin Law School and Howard University School of Law to work for
the Federation of Southern Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund in Epes, Alabama, over the course of the past three
summers. The Federation is an organization of rural agricultural, marketing, and credit cooperatives located throughout
the South that serves a primarily rural and African American population. In addition, the Federation attempts to help
African American landowners retain their land; however, such work is difficult because the Federation does not have
any lawyers on their staff. Each summer, we have had great difficulty in finding attorneys in Alabama interested in
representing the African American landowners and former landowners who have brought their cases to the Federation,
in many cases out of desperation.4
assistance, many of these people do not want the entire land sold.
11 Many of these family members
exit the tenancy in common by selling their interest to nonfamily members.
12 They often do not
know the financial pressure that this may place on other co-tenants who may wish to remain on
the land or to preserve it for the family. Unbeknownst to the family member, the buyer often takes
the interest with the underlying motive of seeking a partition sale.
13 Even the partition actions
initiated by family members who seek a sale of the property tend to be brought by “heirs who are
physically removed from the land.”
14
Through the mechanism of the partition sale, many rural African Americans who had worked
land that had been in the family for generations have been forced off the land in recent decades.
Interestingly, this story has parallels in the land tenure experience of other poor and minority
communities in the United States, especially of land identified with political or spiritual significance
for such communities. For example, at the conclusion of the United States–Mexico War, many
cash-poor Mexicans who sought to confirm prior grants of land (suddenly on the U.S. side of the
border) under the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo lost their land after attorneys who
agreed to represent them in exchange for an interest in the land filed partition actions once they
acquired that interest in the land.
15 Throughout this article, to highlight the common land tenure
problems poor, minorities in this country have faced and continue to face—common problems that
have been little noted by scholars—comparisons are made to certain American Indian land tenure
problems, both historical and contemporary.
Other factors have contributed to the diminishment of the rural African American land base.
Some landowners sold their land voluntarily and did not reinvest in other land.
16 For some this
represented a decision to leave farming or leave the region. Many other, nominally “voluntary”
sales of black-owned land have been “occasioned by trickery, forgery, duress and other means
which give the appearance of ‘voluntariness’ on the face of the conveying instrument.”
17 In these
instances and in other legal proceedings that have led to land loss, lawyers and land speculators
use sharp practices and sometimes commit outright fraud in order to dispossess African Americans
of their land.
18
                                               
11 THE EMERGENCY LAND FUND, THE IMPACT OF HEIR PROPERTY ON BLACK RURAL LAND TENURE IN THE
SOUTHEASTERN REGION OF THE UNITED STATES 280 (1984) [hereinafter THE EMERGENCY LAND FUND].
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 126.
15 See Guadalupe T. Luna, Chicana/Chicano Land Tenure in the Agrarian Domain: On the Edge of a “Knaked
Knife,” 4 MICH. J. RACE & L. 39, 127 (1998).
16 See the CRAT Report, supra note 8, at 14.
17  THE EMERGENCY LAND FUND, supra note 10, at 252–3. Similarly, many “voluntary” sales of Indian-owned land
during the life of the Dawes Act were made under questionable circumstances. Cf. Judith Royster, The Legacy of
Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 5 (1995).
18 Unscrupulous land speculators used many of the legal processes that have contributed to black land loss to
deprive individual American Indians of millions of acres of land between passage of the Burke Act in 1905 and passage
of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934. During this period many of the Indians holding individual allotments were
dispossessed of their land once the federal government removed the trust status and accompanying restrictions on
alienation of their property. The trust status was removed either through expiration of the 25-year period under the Dawes
Act or under provisions of the Burke Act whereby Indians who held allotments were deemed to be “competent” prior5
In addition to partition sales, other legal processes have contributed to involuntary land loss
in rural African American communities. Discrimination in federal agricultural subsidies and
lending—the subject of the Pigford class action—is one factor contributing to involuntary land
loss. Well-respected activists who have worked to promote black land retention in the South over
the past thirty years also cite tax sales, foreclosure, adverse possession, and eminent domain as
legal processes that contribute to the loss of black-owned land.
Of all the legal processes that have contributed to black land loss, however, forced sales of
land represent a particularly harsh mechanism by which someone can lose land under the Hegelian,
personality theory of property set forth by Margaret Jane Radin and others.
19 One can make a
reasonable argument that a landowner who opens himself or herself to adverse possession by not
vigilantly watching over his or her property over an extended period of time may not consider such
ownership vital to their sense of personhood. In contrast, under private forced sales such as
partition sales and foreclosure, other legal actors may force a sale of land in possession of a person
holding some interest in the land who may be productively using the land.
20 Foreclosure is directly
linked to a property owner’s financial insolvency, although racial discrimination often causes or
contributes to the financial ruin of African American property owners in the first instance, as the
judge in the Pigford lawsuit noted.
21 However, unlike the very structure of the legal rules
                                                                                                                                                  
to the expiration of 25 years, even though a great number of these people could neither read nor write. See JANET A.
MCDONNELL, THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN, 1887–1934 120 (1991).
19 MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 197–98 (1993) (“Forced sale is sometimes (but not
always) an injury to personhood. It is not an injury to personhood where the person is appropriately thought of as a
wealth-maximizing entity holding fungible property, but it is an injury to personhood where personal property, taking
on the attribute-aspect, is involved”).  Radin’s discussion of forced sales and “personhood” fits within her broader theory
that grounds property rights in the flourishing of the human personality. According to Radin, property closely associated
with a person—property for personhood—should be more strongly protected than property less imbued with significance
to a person. Radin posits that a person holding property less associated with the personhood perspective holds only
“fungible property rights” that may be overridden. The “personhood perspective” of property is premised upon the notion
that individuals must control certain tangible resources in the external world in order to develop themselves properly.
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982). 
20 Under eminent domain, governmental entities are required to demonstrate that a condemnation of land held by
a property owner will result in some public good for the community as a whole. In contrast, forced sales through partition
sales or foreclosure occur whether or not the person seeking to force a sale can demonstrate that the community will
benefit from such a sale.
21 Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 87 (1999). The Court in Pigford highlighted how the Farmers Home
Administration contributed to the financial demise of Mr. James Beverly which resulted in Mr. Beverly’s being forced
to sell his property. The Court noted:
Mr. James Beverly of Nottaway County, Virginia, was a successful small farmer before going to the FmHA.
To build on his success, in 1981 he began working with the FmHA office to develop a farm plan to expand
and modernize his swine herd operations. The plan called for loans to purchase breeding stock and equipment
as well as farrowing houses that were necessary for the breeding operations. FmHA approved his loans to
buy breeding stock and equipment, and he was told that the loan for farrowing houses would be approved.
After he already had bought the livestock and equipment, his application for a loan to build the farrowing
houses was denied. The livestock and equipment were useless to him without the farrowing houses. Mr.
Beverly ended up having to sell his property to settle his debt to the FmHA.
Id. In a similar vein, many formerly solvent African American homeowners have been driven to bankruptcy and have
lost their homes through foreclosure as a result of the predatory lending practices of certain finance companies that have
targeted minority communities. MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH, WHITE WEALTH: A NEW
PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 21 (1997).6
governing partition actions that encourage forced sales of a tenant in common’s property interest
irrespective of his/her financial solvency or his/her desire to maintain continued ownership of the
land, the legal rules governing foreclosure do not in and of themselves contribute to a person’s
insolvency and subsequent loss of property.
In the African American experience in this country, not only has landownership proved vital
to individual development and democratic participation, but also such ownership has contributed
to building community. Those rural African Americans who acquired land soon after emancipation
rose to join the small numbers of those at the top of the rural, black class structure.
22 Real
improvements in the lives of many of these landowners validated the strongly held view within the
community that landownership could “‘complete their independence’.”
23 These landowners gained
an immediate stake in the economy and helped make the political life of the region more
democratic and robust. Landowning African Americans were much more likely to register, vote,
and run for office than other rural black people.
24
In later periods, including in the era of the civil rights movement, individual black landowners
and landowning groups of African Americans became anchors within their communities; they
served as buffers for their communities from the racism of the surrounding society.
25 Many black
landowners, for instance, dedicated portions of their land for use by the wider community; schools,
churches, and community centers were often built on such dedicated land. Whether land was under
individual or community ownership, such landownership helped improve the life chances of many
destitute, rural African Americans. Not just theory but experience affirms the powerful conviction
amongst African Americans that landownership assures not just a living and autonomy, but that
there is a link between land, community, and power.
Given the historical, unfulfilled promise of governmental reallocation of land after the Civil
War and the undermining of black landownership once achieved without any significant
governmental assistance, our society has a clear moral obligation to reverse the processes that
have stripped black landowners of their land. The Vatican recently urged major land reform in
                                               
22 FONER, supra note 3, at 404.
23 Id. at 104.
24 Id. at 69.
25 RICHARD A. COUTO, AIN’T GONNA LET NOBODY TURN ME AROUND: THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL JUSTICE IN THE
RURAL SOUTH 39–40, 87–8, 244 (1991). Couto’s interview of an African American medical doctor from rural
Tennessee highlights the role that African American owner-operators of farms played in the registration of black voters
in Tennessee during the civil rights movement. In the course of an interview, Dr. Jesse Cannon, Jr., stated:
The largest group of blacks at that time who were heading the movement were people from this particular
community. They were the ones who provided homes for various civil rights workers or other legal people
to have a place to stay during that particular struggle. They provided homes for them, and they knew that they
could provide those homes without fear that some one was going to kick them out of their home because they
were doing that. Not only that, they organized rallies and provided transportation. They did the legwork, and
they organized the first massive groups to descend upon the courthouse here in Brownsville, the county seat,
and they were the ones who stood there in lines for weeks to get registered. They could do this because they
had their own farms. They weren’t tenant farmers who, if they weren’t out there in the fields, they were going
to get kicked off the farms.
Id. at 39.7
poor countries on largely moral grounds.
26 Reform of laws in the United States to promote land
acquisition and retention in disadvantaged communities would be consistent with this international
focus on promoting just patterns of land distribution. Some political and moral thinkers advocate
that land be reallocated to specific ethnic groups in order to promote enhanced cultural integrity
for such groups. Hurst Hannum for one states that “[w]ith few exceptions, a territorial base . . .
is essential to the preservation of a group’s culture.”
27 Yet African Americans who fought to
acquire and retain land throughout the past century were not motivated in the main by the idea of
building a separate and distinct culture that would be separate from the rest of the country. They
sought landownership as a vehicle that could facilitate participation in the larger society. For this
reason, strengthening the ability of African Americans to maintain landownership—no matter how
diffuse or scattered these holdings may be—should specifically concern democrats whose goal is
to increase the participation of African Americans and reverse their historic marginalization. This
article advocates government intervention to promote enhanced landownership—both
quantitatively and qualitatively—for African Americans.
Reform of the state laws of intestacy to narrow the class of heirs to whom property may pass
could prevent fractionation of the ownership interest in the first instance. So, too, public interest
lawyers, legal aid offices, and community activists could work to educate landowners of the
importance of estate planning with the goal of family-land retention. Such reforms, however,
would only marginally impact ownership interests that already are fractionated. In these cases, the
horse is already out of the barn. Instead, this paper maintains that the problem of fractionated heir
property within the rural, African American community justifies more fundamental reform of
common property law and the creation of government institutions that would have the capacity
to help those who own heir property restructure their ownership in a way that the ownership could
be stabilized and the property could be used productively.
Federal intervention to address the issue of fractionated heir property in minority hands would
not be unprecedented. In 1984, Congress recognized that the problem of fractionated heir property
in Indian hands, mostly in the West, warranted drastic intervention, notwithstanding the fact that
the particular proposed solution—twice ruled unconstitutional by the Supreme Court
28—remains
contested both within and without the American Indian community. Moreover, under the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 (“the IRA”),
29 the federal government reversed its fifty-year policy
of assimilation that it had sought to advance in part by land dispossession under the Dawes Act.
Supporters of the IRA made clear that landownership must be maintained for American Indians
given that land is so strongly identified with the American Indian heritage and is strongly linked
to the community’s sovereignty and survival. Notwithstanding the shortcomings of the act
identified by many in the American Indian community and by a number of academics, the IRA has
helped arrest the precipitous loss of Indian land that occurred between 1887 and 1934 under the
                                               
26 PONTIFICAL COUNCIL FOR JUSTICE AND PEACE, TOWARDS A BETTER DISTRIBUTION OF LAND (1997). Other
world religions such as the Baha’i Faith have also specifically addressed the importance of farmers and the role of the
agricultural sector to society. See, e.g., BAHA’I PUBLISHING TRUST, THE PROMULGATION OF UNIVERSAL PEACE: TALKS
DELIVERED BY ‘ABDU’L-BAHÁ DURING HIS VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA IN 1912 217 (2d ed. 1982)
(“The fundamental basis of the community is agriculture, tillage of the soil. All must be producers”).
27 HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY, AND SELF-DETERMINATION 112 (1990)
28 See Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234 (1997); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
29 Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 988.8
terms of the General Allotment Act of 1887 and other congressional acts enacted during this time
period.
The reforms proposed in this paper are not race specific for the most part; land tenure
amongst rural landowners and small farmers generally would be strengthened should these
proposals be enacted. Given the specific examples of linkage between landownership and
community in many parts of the Black Belt, land tenure reform provides a tested strategy,
consistent with the American liberal tradition, to promote racial justice and a more democratic
society. This would suggest that the federal government’s possible payment of $50,000 to Mr.
Beverly without restoring his farm to him not only fails to make him whole economically, but also
leaves him one short in the “bundle of democratic tools” that he formerly possessed. Although the
court in Pigford took the fatalistic position that “[h]istorical discrimination cannot be undone,”
30
our legal institutions should do their very best to make whole, as both economic and civic actors,
African Americans unfairly dispossessed of their land. Short of this, the federal government should
act now to ensure that rural, black landownership does not become merely an interesting, but
short-lived chapter in American history.
                                               
30 Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82, 112 (1999).9
1.  PARTITION SALES OF BLACK-OWNED LAND:
How the rules of tenancies in common and patterns of family wealth
transmission contribute to land loss in rural, African American
communities
Though many legal rules and processes contribute to black land loss, activists and academics agree
that partition sales of land held under tenancies in common and tax sales are common avenues of
land loss.
31 These experts also conclude that foreclosure,
32 adverse possession,
33 and eminent
domain also contribute to land loss.
34 In some of these legal proceedings, opportunists use sharp
practices to acquire black-owned land against the clear will of most of those owning such land.
35
One organization with long experience promoting black land retention claims that “a sale for
partition and division is the most widely used legal method facilitating the loss of heir property”
within the African American communities they serve.
36  In order to understand how partition sales
cause loss of black-owned land, one needs to understand the tenancy in common as a form of
concurrent ownership of land and the consequences of estate planning practices common of a large
number of poor, rural African Americans.
                                               
31 See, e.g., THE EMERGENCY LAND FUND, supra note 10, at 251–77; see also THE BLACK RURAL LANDOWNER—
ENDANGERED  SPECIES  xix–xx  (Leo McGee and Robert Boone  eds., 1979) [hereinafter  THE  BLACK  RURAL
LANDOWNER]; ONLY SIX MILLION ACRES: THE DECLINE OF BLACK-OWNED LAND IN THE RURAL SOUTH 50 (Robert
S. Browne ed., 1973); and The Decline of Minority Farming in the United States, supra note 6, at 66. One of the most
respected attorney-advocates of black farmers and black land retention, David Harris, left the Durham, North Carolina-
based, Land Loss Prevention Project in 1998 to serve as associate counsel heading up the civil rights division within the
U.S. Department of Agriculture. Elizabeth Wellington, Champion of Black Farmers Takes New Role, THE NEWS AND
OBSERVER, Jan. 18, 1998, at B1.
32 BROWNE, supra note 30, at 50. See also Pigford, 185 F.R.D. at 87.
33 THE EMERGENCY LAND FUND, supra note 10, at 251.
34 BROWNE, supra note 30, at 45.
35 THE EMERGENCY LAND FUND, supra note 10, at 44 (“There is an array of persons and entities that prey on the
heir property situation by practices which are, although technically legal, clearly unscrupulous. These persons and entities
include lawyers, judges, individual citizens, businessmen, marginal lending institutions, land speculators, and public
officials”).
36 Id. at 273; see also John G. Casagrande, Jr., Note, Acquiring Property Through Forced Partitioning Sales:
Abuses and Remedies, 27 B.C. L. REV. 755, 756 n. 9 (1986) (noting that Edward Pennick of the Federation of Southern
Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund estimated in 1985 that half of the cases at that time leading to the drop in black land
ownership involved partition actions that led to a sale of black-owned property). Although the author has spoken to
representatives of both the Land Loss Prevention Project in Durham, North Carolina, and the Federation of Southern
Cooperatives/Land Assistance Fund who confirm that they have handled hundreds of cases in which black rural
landowners have lost land as the result of partition actions, a LEXIS search uncovered only one reported state case that
explicitly addressed the partition sales of black-owned rural land. See McNeely v. Bone, 287 Ark. 339, 341, 698 S.W.2d
512 (Ark. 1985) (holding that partition sale of black-owned property did not violate 5
th and 14
th Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution even if the sale of the land was below market price). 10
1.1 TENANCIES IN COMMON
General characteristics
Tenancies in common are the most widespread form of concurrent estates in land.
37 Unlike the
joint tenancy, which normally requires the presence of the four “unities” of time, title, interest, and
possession, a tenancy in common merely provides that each of the common owners who hold an
undivided interest in the property is entitled to use and possess the entire property.
38  Unlike the
joint tenancy’s right of survivorship, a tenant in common may alienate his or her interest during
life and at death without seeking the consent of his or her other co-tenants.
39
Like the joint tenancy and other common-law concurrent estates, but unlike other forms of
common ownership of equity resources created by statute such as the corporation, no formal
management structure inheres by law in a tenancy in common. The allocation of management
responsibilities between tenants in and out of possession must be worked out in each particular
case, if this allocation is worked out at all. The common law has developed some rules that
allocate rights between co-tenants with respect to use and maintenance of the property. These
include rules that govern the rights of an “ousted” co-tenant, the distribution of rental income paid
by third parties, and the right to contribution for the payment of ongoing costs such as property
taxes, mortgages, and necessary repairs.
40 Yet these rules are not comprehensive, uniform, or
prophylactic; they do not allocate responsibility for paying the ongoing expenses of co-owned
property between the common owners in the first instance, the area in which most conflicts
amongst tenants occurs.
A tenant in common who fails to pay his or her proportional share of these ongoing expenses
does not lose any interest in the property.
41 Not surprisingly, “free-rider” problems
42 are frequent.
The tenant who has paid more than a pro rata share of ongoing costs of maintaining the property
may seek to recoup payments made in excess of his or her share against other co-tenants.
43
However, such contribution actions can jeopardize the interests of those who desire to maintain
ongoing ownership of the land. Some courts permit a tenant in common to initiate an independent
action short of a final accounting against his or her fellow co-tenants seeking contribution for
repair costs incurred in excess of the tenant’s pro rata share; other courts maintain that such a co-
tenant can recover these excess repair expenses only in a final accounting as part of a partition
action that terminates the concurrent ownership estate.
44 Many times one co-tenant pays more than
his share of the property taxes. Due to the fact that the co-tenants are not personally liable in most
circumstances for payment of the property taxes, the tenant who has paid more than his/her pro
                                               
37 ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 5.2, at 188, (2d ed. 1993).
38 Id.
39 Id. at 190.
40 Id. at §§ 5.9, 5.10, at 215–222.
41 The Emergency Land Fund, supra note 10, at 43.
42 JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 49–50 (4
th ed. 1998).
43 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 36, at 215–17.
44 Id. at 215.11
rata share of the property taxes may recoup such excess expenses only after a court sells the
property at a judicial sale and equitably distributes the proceeds from the sale.
45
Partition sale
In most social contexts, a tenancy in common represents an unstable form of common ownership
of equity. Each interest may be freely alienated by the holder, allowing any co-tenant to bring a
stranger into the community of ownership. A person holding an undivided interest in a tenancy in
common—no matter how small that interest may be—may file a partition action to terminate the
co-tenancy without the consent of the other co-tenants.
46 The court will either order that the
property be partitioned in kind (resulting in the physical division of property) or that the entire
property be sold and the proceeds of the sale distributed.
47
Most state statutes provide that a physical division of the property is the preferred remedy in
a partition action; a partition sale should be ordered only if the parties would be prejudiced by a
partition in kind. Yet courts now order partition sale in almost every case.
48 Although some courts
and commentators still refer to partition sale as a drastic remedy,
49 the current preference for
partition sale reflects the ascendant economic view that places primary importance on individual
wealth maximization. According to this view, an economically valuable parcel of land should be
allocated to the person willing to pay the highest price on the free market.
50 This assures efficient
use, at least theoretically. In accordance with this view, partition sale is preferred over partition
in kind because land sold as a unit often has a higher economic value than the aggregate value of
subdivided parcels that result from a division in kind.
51 Further, transferring ownership from
common owners who may not be able to compete against more wealthy or better financed bidders
at a forced, public sale constitutes a public good under this view because the value of
landownership is measured only against the market. Therefore, it is irrelevant if many of these
forced sales transfer land from smallholders to large landowners, including large corporate
interests. As one commentator holding this view has claimed:
[A] rule favoring sales in partition actions would promote efficiency by placing the property on the
open market where co-owners opposing a sale or having a particular emotional attachment to the
property would have an opportunity to retain possession by outbidding all comers. Therefore, the
market price would reflect both the objective and the subjective values of the property. . . . Under
the principle of wealth maximization, when property is placed on the open market, courts are
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47 CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 36, § 5.13, at 229.
48 Id. at 231; see also DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 41, at 347; 4A R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
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L. REV. 855, 862 (1986).
49 See, e.g., Vesper v. Farnsworth, 40 Wis. 357, 359 (Wis. 1876) (holding that a “partition sale is a dangerous
expedient, exposing those of the parties who are not able to bid at the same, to the deprivation of their property without
just compensation”); see also JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 719 (2d ed. 1997)
(“[P]artition is a drastic remedy that may very well result in a sale of the property”).
50 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 82–86 (5
th ed. 1998).
51 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets,
111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 665 (1998).12
assured that the property will fetch the highest price possible and will end up in the hands of the
party who values it most.
52
By liberal, or even routine, orders for partition sale, the courts now enable an individual co-tenant,
no matter how small his/her interest in the land, to force a sale of the entire property so as to
maximize the amount of money s/he will receive in the distribution of the proceeds.
 The current preference for partition sale represents a particular application of the modern
view that land is merely a fungible commodity whose value should be determined by the market.
53
The shift in the view of the economic importance of land roughly tracks the transition from
classical to neoclassical economics that many economic scholars claim occurred in the late 1800s.
54
By the conclusion of World War II, economists increasingly challenged the traditional view that
land holds unique value.
55 At present, the view that “land is no different than the other factors of
production” is the predominant one in most economic textbooks, and those textbooks have
directly influenced the thinking of economists and noneconomists alike.
56
The development of the law in partition actions mirrors the shift in views by many economists
with respect to the importance of landownership. Older judicial opinions, along with a handful of
more contemporary decisions, take into account the noneconomic interests of those who wish to
maintain landownership. In Delfino v. Vealencis,
57 for example, the Supreme Court of Connecticut
reversed a lower court decision that ordered a partition sale and stated that “[i]t is the interests of
all of the tenants in common that the court must consider; . . . and not merely the economic gain
of one tenant, or a group of co-tenants.”
58 Now, courts primarily seek to protect the economic
interests of individual co-tenants. Nevertheless, as discussed infra, the modern practice of
routinely ordering partition sales in order to maximize the monetary return of an individual tenant
stands in contrast to the legal rules regulating exit from other common-ownership forms such as
corporations, other noncorporate business organizations. and condominium associations.
The rules that govern partition of many, nontribal Indian allotments differ markedly from the
common-law rules of partition just discussed.
59 At least some federal courts vested with exclusive
                                               
52 Reid, supra note 47, at 878–9.
53 LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 63 (1985). In comparing land transactions in the
early American colonies with property transfers in England, Friedman states: “Land transactions shifted from status to
contract; land rights were no longer matters of family birth, and tradition; rather, land was a commodity, traded on the
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54 Emery N. Castle, Why Land Matters (paper commissioned for a conference held at the University of Wisconsin–
Madison), “Who Owns America? Land and Resource Tenure Issues in a Changing Environment”) (June 21–24, 1995)
(on file with the Land Tenure Center).
55 See id. at 1.
56 Id. at 5.
57 436 A.2d 27 (Conn. 1980).
58 Id. at 33.
59 As in many areas of federal Indian law, the law governing partition actions for Indian-owned land is complicated.
State partition laws apply to those allotments that are subject to the General Allotment Act. See FELIX S. COHEN,
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 623 (Rennard Strickland ed. 1982) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW]. In some states, the state courts have jurisdiction over partition actions. For example, allotments owned
by members of the “Five Civilized Tribes” became subject to the partition laws of the State of Oklahoma in 1918. See13
jurisdiction over partition actions involving American Indian tenancies in common appear to be
more sensitive to the implications and equities of ordering a division in kind as opposed to a
partition sale than many state courts hearing partition actions in the non-Indian context. For
example, in Oyler v. United States,
60 on a motion for reconsideration of a court-ordered partition
sale of an Indian allotment, the district court set aside its order for a partition sale and imposed an
order that provided mixed relief, including division in kind of most of the 94-acre tract, and sale
and reallocation to one group of defendants of a 2.6-acre tract.
61 In ordering a remedy that mostly
consisted of partition in kind, the court noted that the majority of the interest holders opposed
sale.
62 The court also considered the consequences of ordering a sale of land that the defendants
valued as part of their heritage, especially in a manner that would not fully compensate the parties
after subtracting the costs of the litigation. The court stated:
[I]t appears less likely to the court that all of the parties will realize the full value of their interest
in the land if a public sale of the property occurs. Even if the land is sold precisely at the appraised
value, after the costs of this action are subtracted from the proceeds of the sale, some of the parties
will receive precious little compensation for land which, if nothing else, represents their Indian
heritage.
63
The Oyler court acknowledged not just the real-world, economic ramifications of ordering a
partition sale, but specifically took into account the land’s significance to one group of Americans
dispossessed of much of their historical land base. The Oyler court’s concern for preserving Indian
heritage land has few analogs in partition cases involving land acquired by African Americans
following emancipation.
1.2 PATTERNS OF FAMILY WEALTH TRANSMISSION AMONGST POOR, RURAL
AFRICAN AMERICANS CONTRIBUTE TO THE FRACTIONATION OF INTERESTS
AND MAKE MUCH BLACK-OWNED LAND A TARGET FOR LAND SPECULATORS
The tenancy in common represents a potentially unstable form of ownership because alienability
is unrestricted and the partition remedy is weighted toward dissolution. A tenancy in common with
a large numbers of co-tenants is even more unstable simply because the problems of free-riding
and exit are multiplied.
64 Because of the low incidence of estate planning amongst poor, rural
African Americans,
65 much of the black-owned land base in the South has been traditionally
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60 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5652 (92-2104 Mar. 17, 1995).
61 Id. at *3–6.
62 Id. at *14.
63 Id. at *14, n. 9.
64 See C. Scott Graber, Heirs Property: The Problems and Possible Solutions, Sept. 1978 Clearinghouse Rev.
273, 277 (1978) (“One thousand heirs provide 1,000 targets to a person who really wants the land”).
65 As discussed infra, the incidence of will-making amongst rural, African American landowners may not be that
much lower than the rate of will-making amongst poor people generally despite the assumption by many commentators
who have written articles suggesting that African American landowners make wills at an especially low rate.14
transferred from one generation to another under state intestacy laws.
66 Property acquired under
the intestacy laws is commonly referred to as “heir property.”
67
Although a tenancy in common created by volition and a tenancy in common created by
operation of the laws of intestacy may be governed by the same set of property laws,
68 these two
different methods of formation yield ownership arrangements that are quite different in character.
A tenancy in common created consensually resembles a closely held corporation: there tend to be
a small number of co-owners, each member of the ownership structure knows the other owners,
and the owners are likely to live within close proximity of one another. A tenancy in common
created under the laws of intestacy, by contrast, bundles together groups of people who may have
little actual connection to one another or even knowledge of one another’s existence.
69
First, as time passes, not only do the number of interests increase in a tenancy in common
created by operation of law, but divergences also appear in the size of individual ownership
interests, especially after any in the first generation of heirs with children or lineal heirs die and
their interests pass to their descendants.
70 When the property comes to be held by owners from
multiple generations, the common owners are likely to value the land differently and conflicts are
more likely to arise. Further, as the number of interests increase, the owners are more likely to live
in scattered locations. Decisions regarding the disposition of the property that may have been fairly
simply to coordinate when all of the tenants in common resided, for example, in Sumpter County,
Alabama, become more difficult if some common owners live in Demopolis, Alabama, others in
Albany, Georgia, and still others in Chicago, Illinois.
71 And as the number of interests increase,
it becomes difficult to locate and keep track of all of the owners: problems arise with the known
but unlocatable heir and with unknown heirs.
72 Moreover, unlike land that is purchased or
transferred by gift or devise, heir property lacks record title.
73 Because of these characteristics of
heir property, economic development of a significant proportion of land owned by African
Americans has been stifled. Owners have difficulty obtaining financing and co-owners may not be
able to agree on the most appropriate use of the land.
Consider the case study of an African American estate in Mississippi conducted by the
Emergency Land Fund. A certain African American named John Brown purchased 80 acres of land
in Rankin County, Mississippi, in 1887.
74 After he died intestate in 1935, the land continued to be
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67 THE EMERGENCY LAND FUND, supra note 10, at 8. In St. Lucia, a country in the Caribbean, such land is referred
to as “family land.” See John W. Bruce, Family Land Tenure and Agricultural Development in St. Lucia, Land Tenure
Center R.P. 79, U.S. ISSN 0084-0815 (1983).
68 The two different types of tenancies in common will be governed by the same property law if the tenancy in
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tenancy in common created by operation of law.
69 THE EMERGENCY LAND FUND, supra note 10, at 62. For example, one study has revealed that a typical heir
property tract in the Southeast is owned by eight people, five of whom live outside of the southeastern region. Id.
70 See THE EMERGENCY LAND FUND, supra note 10, at 40.
71 See id. at 42–3.
72 Id. at 43.
73 Id. at 44.
74 Id. at 283.15
passed down by intestacy. By the time an heir holding more than 50 percent of the interest in the
land filed for a partition in kind of the property in 1978, there were 77 heirs who held an interest
in the property, with the smallest interest holder owning a 1/19,440th interest in the land.
75 Like
many other cases, the desire of the majority interest holder to secure a physical partition of the
land was frustrated as the court decided to order a sale of the property after a few of the other
heirs holding a minority interest objected to the proposed division of the property.
76 The
fractionated heir property problem within rural African American communities manifested by the
John Brown estate is typical; a 1984 study estimated that 41 percent of black-owned land in the
southeastern states is heir property.
77
If heir property tends to be highly fractionated and fractionation increases the risk of partition,
then this pattern of family wealth transmission directly contributes to black land loss. The evidence
is that at least half and perhaps most rural, African American landowners in the South have not
made wills. Because parents, grandparents, and great-grandparents did not make wills either, a
significant proportion of rural, black-owned land in the South can be labeled heir property. Two
separate studies conducted within restricted geographical areas of the South indicate that most
rural, black landowners have not made wills. One study surveyed 1,708 black landowners in 10
counties located in 5 southeastern states. Eighty-one percent of the black owners of rural parcels
had not made wills.
78 Another study of 120 rural, black landowners in 12 counties in south-central
Alabama found that 56 percent of these landowners had not made wills.
79
As an aside, the assumption that the rate of will-making for rural, African American
landowners lags far behind that of other, similarly situated landowners appears misguided.
Moreover, it is difficult to determine whether the pattern of will-making within the rural African
American landowning group is a marker of class or race because there are not many similar studies
of poor, rural white landowners.
80 More broadly, one study indicates that 55 percent of people
surveyed in five states had not made wills.
81 This five-state study also indicates that 65 percent of
those with family income below $65,000 a year do not make wills.
82 Further, 72 percent of those
with estates worth less than $130,000 and 50 percent of those with estates worth less that
$260,000 had not made wills.
83 
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79 Robert Zabawa and Ntam Baharanyi, Estate Planning Strategies and the Continuing Phenomenon of Black-
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Moreover, the explanations offered by academics for the numbers of rural black landowners
who have not made wills are not very convincing. Although one study ascribes the failure of many
rural black landowners to make wills to a legal system that African Americans had come to
mistrust because their property interests were often not protected by it, there does not appear to
be any empirical evidence to support this assertion.
84 In fact, the survey results of black
landowners who both made and had failed to make wills—included in the report—seems to
contradict the historical explanation and suggests that many of those who experienced the most
direct racism had learned the importance making wills.
85 Other commentators have suggested that
descendants of slaves brought from Africa to different parts of the world have come to rely on the
laws of intestacy to further the supposed West African customary practice of succession under
which all children inherit.
86 However, given the wide representation of ethnic groups amongst
those who were brought to this country as slaves from Africa and the impact that the slavery
experience had on transforming traditional culture, it appears unlikely that the rate of will-making
can be linked to some particularized, traditional African cultural practice.
87 Interestingly, the
cultural explanations offered for the failure of many people of African descent to make wills have
parallels with the explanations some have offered for the high percentage of American Indians who
have not made wills which has led to the fractionation of many individual Indian allotments.
88
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87 See Bruce, supra note 66, at 14–5.
88 A group called the Indian Agricultural Committee (“IAC”) has proposed policy reforms to address the
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Although the root causes of the low incidence of will-making amongst rural, African
American landowners are not well understood, it does appear that many black landowners lack
a sophisticated understanding of the legal rules governing the transfer of property from one
generation to another. Two studies indicate that a clear majority of the black landowners surveyed
were apathetic about preparing a will, expressing the sentiment that they simply “had not got
around to it.”
89 However, the surveys also revealed that many of the landowners were quite
misinformed about the laws governing tenancies in common. In one study, almost 75 percent of
those acquiring property through intestacy believed that all the tenants in common must consent
to a sale of the land.
90 The misconceptions held by many rural, African Americans concerning the
laws that govern tenancies in common suggest that these communities have comparatively limited
access to attorneys and indicate that meaningful policy reform would include proposals designed
to increase the access such owners have to legal professionals for purposes of basic estate
planning.
The reliance on intestacy has contributed to intense fractionation of property held under
common ownership structures within other poor communities both in the United States and in
other countries. For American Indians, one commentator has stated that the heirship problem, “[is]
second only to alienation amongst the evils wrought by” the era of the allotment of Indian lands
that was federal Indian policy between 1887 and 1934.
91 Studies by the U.S. Senate and the U.S.
House of Representatives in the early 1960s indicated that one-half of the allotted Indian lands
then held in trust by the federal government had become fractionated.
92 The Supreme Court noted
the problem in Hodel v. Irving.
“The failure of the allotment program became clearer as successive generations came to hold the
allotted lands. Thus 40-, 80-, and 160-acre parcels became splintered into multiple undivided
interests in land, with some parcels having hundreds, and many parcels having dozens, of
owners.”
93
Just as the John Brown estate highlighted the intense fractionation of heir property typical of many
rural, African American property holdings, certain tracts of land on the Sisseton-Wahpeton Lake
Traverse Reservation demonstrate the degree of fractionation of all too many Indian allotments.
The average tract on that reservation has 196 owners and the average owner holds undivided
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93 Hodel, 481 U.S. at 707.18
interests in 14 tracts.
94 An especially dramatic example of this fractionation is tract 1305.
According to the Supreme Court:
Tract 1305 is 40 acres and produces $1,080 in income annually. It is valued at $8,000. It has 439
owners, one-third of whom receive less $.05 in annual rent and two-thirds of whom receive less than
$1. The largest interest holder receives $82.25 annually. The common denominator used to compute
fractional interests in the property is 3,394,923,840,000. The smallest heir receives $.01 every 177
years. If the tract were sold (assuming the 489 owners could agree) for its estimated $8,000 value,
he would be entitled to $.000418. The administrative costs of handling this tract are estimated by
the Bureau of Indian Affairs at $17,560 annually.
95
Fractionation of individually owned Indian trust land precludes meaningful economic development,
preventing wealth generation from one generation to another. However, such fractionation has not
led to significant land loss because of the different application of partition laws in cases involving
much of nontribal, Indian trust land. Until 1980, the Interior Department had maintained that even
a partition in kind of an Indian allotment required the consent of all of the tenants in common.
96
In 1980, a federal district court in South Dakota ruled that at the discretion of the Secretary of the
Interior a partition can be ordered even if only one co-tenant files an application.
97 Even after
Sampson, however, partition sales do not appear to be a major source of land loss in the American
Indian community.
Outside of the United States, other poor communities have also experienced significant
problems with fractionation of commonly owned property. In St. Lucia and other Caribbean
countries, for example, “family land” has become intensely fractionated over time due to the failure
of landowners to make wills.
98 Owners of such land find it difficult to secure credit and marketable
title, limiting productive use of their land.
99 But the comparative American Indian and Caribbean
case studies show that the dynamic of land loss requires more than just fractionated heir property.
Partition rules are crucial. In contrast to rural, African Americans, St. Lucian owners of “family
land” have not lost much of their land through partition because the law does not allow an
individual common owner to seek partition without the consent of all the other common owners.
100
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2. AFRICAN AMERICAN LAND IMPERATIVE AND HISTORICAL
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO LAND LOSS
Africans brought to this country and enslaved were denied the right to acquire land by law. Aside
from being denied basic human rights under the slave system, some commentators argue that the
African slaves had no prior experience with private ownership of land. According to this view,
despite the linguistic and cultural practices that distinguished the slaves who were brought to the
New World from different regions in West Africa, the slaves as a group were all drawn from
societies that practiced communal land tenure.
101 Whether or not this assessment is fully accurate,
over time the American slave system squelched the ability to practice the culture of African
ancestors and reoriented the enslaved to a system with different economic values. As time
progressed, the slaves “began to think of themselves more and more as individuals bound together
by the exploitative system of human bondage, and less as culturally united by a distinct African
culture(s).”
102
Thrust into the lower rungs of an economic system that promoted individualism, African
American slaves accepted the notion that a better life was possible through the accumulation of
capital and property, even if their capacity to participate in the economic system was severely
constrained.
103 From the earliest days in America, an internal slave economy developed that
enabled African Americans to participate in limited ways in the economic life of this country. In
early colonial Virginia, for example, many plantation owners set aside small tracts of land for their
slaves to use to grow food for themselves.
104 Although slaves were almost never allowed to
acquire real property, many acquired some personal property that was owned individually, as
opposed to collectively.
 Property ownership amongst slaves remained small during the eighteenth century, but by the eve
of the Civil War—according to comments of slaveholders, increasing enactments to halt “pretended
ownership,” the recollection of former slaves, and the reports of postwar investigators—
considerable numbers of slaves had become property owners. They possessed cattle, milk, cows,
horses, pigs, chickens, cotton, rice, tobacco, gold and silver coin, wagons, buggies, fancy clothing,
and in rare instances even real estate.
105
Further, in the antebellum period, the incentive to acquire capital was particularly felt by those
African Americans given the opportunity to purchase their freedom.
106 Those fortunate enough
to be freed spared no effort to become property owners.
107
After issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, the freedmen and freedwomen fully
expected the government to redistribute land throughout the South to a new class of black
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smallholders.
108 The great majority of emancipated slaves had experience only in agriculture,
109
but lacked any resources to purchase land.
110 These hopes of land reallocation seemed justified by
events that occurred both in the closing phases of the Civil War and in the actions taken by the
federal government soon thereafter. In his march through the South, General Sherman issued Field
Order 15 on 16 January 1865, declaring as abandoned land the Sea Islands stretching from
Savannah, Georgia, to Charleston, South Carolina, a total of 485,000 acres of land.
111 Within
months of this order, General Rufus Saxton, tasked with implementing Sherman’s order, settled
40,000 freedmen on the islands on 40-acre plots. In addition to land, Sherman authorized Saxton
to give surplus horses and mules to the freedmen to the extent they were available.
112 As it would
turn out, General Saxton’s allotment of land to the freedmen on the Sea Islands under Field Order
15 would constitute the greatest land redistribution program ever benefiting African Americans
in this country’s history.
113
Furthermore, in March 1865, Congress established the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and
Abandoned Lands (“the Freedmen’s Bureau”).
114 The legislation creating this agency “promised
every male citizen, whether refugee or freedman, forty acres of land at rental for three years with
an option to buy.”
115 And in 1866, Congress passed the Southern Homestead Act opening to the
freed slaves settlement of 46 million acres of public lands. The 1866 Homestead Act differed from
the Homestead Act of 1862 in that the latter provided for homesteading only by non-Confederate
whites.
116 In the first two years of the Southern Homestead Act, applicants could apply for
settlement of 80 acres of land; later this limit was increased to 180 acres.
117
Ultimately, however, hopes for significant land reform were destroyed.
118 The impact of the
Freedmen’s Bureau was muted and the Southern Homestead Act has been labeled “a dismal
failure.”
119 Although the Freedmen’s Bureau had 850,000 acres of land under its control in
1865,
120 half of the land was returned to the former white owners by mid-1866.
121 Further, several
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months after passage of the Freedmen’s Bill, President Andrew Johnson began issuing a number
of pardons to former Confederates and ordered General O.O. Howard, commissioner of the
Freedmen’s Bureau, to issue a circular restoring land to the pardoned southerners.
122 Few African
Americans were able to settle lands under the Southern Homestead Act due to the fact that anyone
who claimed that they had not supported the Confederacy was eligible to apply for land under the
act. Seventy-seven percent of the applicants under the Southern Homestead Act were white by
one estimate, and the limited number of black applicants faced additional hurdles of discrimination
in their effort to obtain government homesteads.
123
Despite the government’s failure to provide significant land to the freed slaves during
Reconstruction, African Americans still maintained their focus on acquiring landownership.
124
Almost completely through private purchase, African Americans acquired 15 million acres of land
in the South between emancipation and 1910, overcoming discriminatory credit practices, violence
perpetuated by anti-black groups, and the refusal of many whites to sell to black people.
125 African
Americans throughout the South overcame obstacles to land acquisition by demonstrating what
can only be described as heroic action. In the agricultural sector, where the overwhelming number
of black landowners were concentrated, black farm owners constituted 16.5 percent of all southern
landowners by 1910.
126 It must be noted, however, that African Americans never were permitted
to purchase any significant amount of prime real estate; for the most part, black people could buy
land in “areas with less fertile soil, perhaps tucked away in the hills, not too close to the main
highways or railroads, nor to white schools or churches.”
127 
No matter what the quality of the land, these remarkable gains in black landownership in the
rural South have almost been wiped out. At the end of this century, African Americans in the
region have been losing land almost as rapidly as their forebears acquired it at the beginning of the
century. One study estimates that almost none of the 15 million acre land base that black people
acquired between 1865 and 1910 remains within the original black families that once owned the
land.
128 Fewer than 3 million acres of land are currently owned by rural, African Americans in
farming, irrespective of when such land was acquired.
129 Black-operated farms today are
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for many reasons. See THE EMERGENCY LAND FUND, supra note 10, at 19–21; see also THE DECLINE OF BLACK
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precise amount of black landholdings. For example, in 1973, one commentator estimated that blacks in the rural South22
concentrated in the southeastern states within the Black Belt
130 and in Texas, Oklahoma, and
California.
131
Black land loss closely tracks the steep decline of black farmers since 1920, a phenomenon
the recently settled class-action lawsuit filed by black farmers against the USDA brought to
national attention in the past year. In 1920, black farm owners accounted for one out of every
seven farms in the United States; today these farms account for less than 1 percent of all U.S.
farms.
132 Overall, the number of black farmers has decreased from a high of 925,708 in 1920 when
one in four black farmers owned their own land
133 to approximately 18,000 today—a 98 percent
decline.
134 The number of white farmers has declined as well, but the rate of decline of black
farmers far outpaces that of white farmers.
135 Even in 1870, just five years after the end of the Civil
War, there were close to 29,000 black farm owners in the South.
136
With the age distribution of black farmers heavily tilted toward older farmers, the future of
black farmers in America looks, if possible, worse. The 1997 agricultural census counted only 745
black farmers under 35 years of age in the entire country, most of them concentrated in the
Southern states; these young farmers comprised just 4 percent of all black farmers.
137 Black
farmers who were 70 years or older easily constituted the largest group of black farmers,
representing 24 percent of the total.
138 Overall, the average age of black farmers was the highest
of any identified group of farmers, whether minority or white.
139
General economic shifts in the agricultural industry have squeezed out many small farmers—
the group in which most black farmers are concentrated.
140 The few remaining black farmers face
the additional threat of being forced out of farming due to continued discrimination by the USDA.
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139 1997 CENSUS OF AGRICULTURE, supra note 5, at 24, 26.
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Applications for farm credit and other benefits available under the USDA are approved or denied
by state, by county committees of local farmers.
141 Federal regulations mandate that those eligible
to elect commissioners to the three to five member county committees and those eligible to be
elected must possess an interest in a farm either as owner, operator, tenant, or sharecropper.
142
Paralleling the small percentage of black farmers nationally, there are only 37 African American
county commissioners out of 8,147 county commissioners nationwide.
143
The settlement of the Pigford class action made no substantive changes to the federal
mechanism of loan determinations that vests so much power in local commissioners.
144 Given the
historic and stubborn refusal of these commissioners to treat black farmers fairly, even after
repeated federal studies over the past decades documented blatant discrimination against black
farmers by USDA officials and county commissioners,
145 disparity in government support for black
farmers is likely to recur despite the settlement of the Pigford lawsuit. In fact, at the very time the
government was settling the Pigford lawsuit, black farmers in Arkansas and Georgia claimed that
commissioners in five county offices in the two states improperly denied black farmers disaster
assistance.
146 One constant phenomenon has recurred since the first government reports
highlighted discrimination against black farmers over 30 years ago—the number of black farmers
has declined after each report has been issued. In fact, whereas the U.S. Commission on Civil
Rights reported that there were only 57,271 black farm operators in 1982,
147 the 1997 census
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reports that there are currently just 18,451 black farm operators in the country.
148 Even if
discrimination is rooted out, policies designed to uphold all small farmers—white and minority—
must be implemented in order to renew the prospects for small farmers who have not prospered
under this country’s agricultural policy over the past half-century.
149
Members of the Pigford class publicly voice concern about an issue even more fundamental
than the issue of whether or not African American farmers will survive. They believe the actions
of the USDA and its state agents have been designed to strip away the diminishing number of acres
under black ownership in rural America.
150 Some believe the USDA participated in a conspiracy
to take land from black farmers.
151 Others say the refusal to restore land lost as a direct result of
the USDA’s acknowledged discrimination amounts to an intentional choice to dispossess black
farmers of their land. At root, these allegations reflect the view that black-owned rural land is a
political and not just a cultural or economic heritage. Without land, they fear, African Americans
will have less power to build community and to exercise the range of activities associated with full
citizenship in a democracy.
Behind the raw numbers indicating a historic decline in the numbers of black landowners in
the rural South are other factors, including African American migration patterns in this century.
As blacks left the South, the dispersal of family contributed to less secure common ownership of
real land left behind. Ironically, at the peak of black landownership and farming in the South in
1910, large numbers of African Americans began migrating out of the South. This “Great
Migration” continued through the 1960s and fundamentally redistributed the black population of
the country.
152 In 1900, 90 percent of black people lived in the South;
153 by 1980, the percentage
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Many minority and limited-resource farmers believe that USDA has participated in a conspiracy to take their
land. They cite as proof the severe decline in farm ownership by minorities, especially African American
farmers, in the last 70 years. Much of this land had been owned for generations, in some cases acquired by
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Id.
152 Initially, “The Great Migration” referred to the migration of black people out of the South that occurred during
and soon after World War I. More generally, the term has also been used to capture the migration of blacks out of the
South during and after World War II. Stewart E. Tolnay, The Great Migration and Changes in the Northern Black
Family, 1940 to 1990, 75 SOC. FORCES 1213 (1997). Between 1910 and 1920, 525,000 African Americans migrated
out of the South; in the 1920s, 877,000 black people left the South. REYNOLDS FARLEY & WALTER R. ALLEN, THE
COLOR LINE AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE IN AMERICA 113 (1987). Prior to 1910, blacks had migrated out of the South
in much smaller numbers. In the 1870s, 70,000 left; in the 1880s, 80,000 left; in the 1890s, 174,000 left; and between
1900 and 1910, 197,000 more left. The doubling of the numbers of blacks migrating out of the region in the period
between 1890 and 1910 as compared to the period between 1870 and 1890 has been attributed, in part, to the increasing25
had declined to 50 percent.
154 Various push and pull factors encouraged blacks to leave the South
in large numbers during the World War I period. With the onset of war in 1914, northern factories
expanded their production; at the same time, the cheap supply of labor from southern and eastern
Europe dried up due to the outbreak of war.
155 In the same period, in Louisiana in 1906, and
moving to Mississippi in 1913 and to Alabama in 1916, the Mexican boll weevil wreaked havoc
on the southern cotton crop.
156 The appearance of the boll weevil coincided with a plunge in the
price of cotton and a series of floods that hit the South in 1915 and 1916.
157 These natural
devastations led southern planters to shift their production to food crops and livestock, which
required fewer tenant farmers and day laborers.
158
As once relatively unified African American families dispersed, those who remain in the region
and in possession of family agricultural land and those who left sometimes have come to value
their common property holdings differently. But the legal rules governing tenancies in common
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the outbreak of World War I, World War II served as the primary “pull” factor that drew American Indians out of rural
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156 MASSEY & DENTON, supra note 151, at 29.
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in conjunction with intestacy rules do not distinguish between family members who disperse and
lose all meaningful connection to the land and those who maintain meaningful ties to the land. As
noted before, many migrants out of the region during the Great Migration (and their descendants)
unwittingly sell their interests in land in the South to land speculators who then initiate legal
proceedings that force a sale of the entire family’s landholdings. The distant relatives
geographically removed from the land are almost never cognizant that the fractional interests they
sell will be used as a lever to force their distant relations off of family land.27
3.  POLITICAL AND PROPERTY THEORY
Together with comparative studies supports the view that land can provide
the basis for community and ground greater democratic participation
3.1 VISIONS OF PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY IN A RACIALLY MIXED SOCIETY
Although emancipated from slavery over one hundred years ago, African Americans never realized
the full benefits of citizenship as measured by the ability to participate meaningfully in the political
and economic life of the country. Undeniably, the history of struggle has been dynamic and
uneven. There have been periods in which African Americans as a group, often with the assistance
of others committed to social justice, acquired greater social capital and thereby improved their
social and economic status. Yet in other periods of retrenchment the wider society scaled back its
commitment to bringing African Americans into the mainstream of American life.
Iris Marion Young asserts that participatory democracy has both instrumental and intrinsic
value. Instrumentally, involvement in the political life of one’s community is the best way for
citizens to express their views and to ensure that their interests are not crowded out by others.
159
In terms of the intrinsic value of democracy, Young draws upon the work of Rousseau and John
Stuart Mill to emphasize the development of human capacities for self-government and social
relation:
Having and exercising the opportunity to participate in making collective decisions that affect one’s
actions or the conditions of one’s actions fosters the development of capacities for thinking about
one’s own needs in relation to the needs of others, taking an interest in the relation of others to
social institutions, reassuring and being articulate and persuasive, and so on. Only such
participation, moreover, can give persons a sense of active relation to social institutions and
processes.
160
In the past half century, those fighting to change the persistent, subordinate status of African
Americans have worked hard to develop mechanisms that would provide African Americans with
more ability to participate meaningfully in electoral politics. Elections and voting rights, however,
have not always been the central strategy for empowerment within the American black community.
Since emancipation, black leaders advanced sometimes-conflicting strategies to promote the
group’s uplift, with the conflict between integration and nationalist or self-determination strategies.
In the nineteenth century, Frederick Douglass contended that black Americans had no desire
to form their own state or to return to Africa; once freed, he believed black Americans would be
quickly assimilated into the mainstream of society.
161 By contrast, Martin Delany, the leading black
nationalist of that time, maintained that any free people needed to be part of the group that ruled
society. Yet he insisted that entrenched racism would prevent black people from ever joining the
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ruling elite in America. Therefore, at one stage of his career Delany advocated that black people
in America should emigrate to Central and South America, as well as the West Indies.
162 Following
emancipation, most freed slaves wanted to become landowners even more than they wanted voting
rights or education.
163 Landownership meant economic security and self-determination.
The conflicting ideologies of nationalists and integrationists converged during the civil rights
movement and, especially, with the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.
164  Black people
along a wide ideological spectrum embraced the view that fundamental change in the social and
economic agenda of the country could be achieved through the ballot box. Many assumed that
increased voting in the black community would result in the election of more black officials, who
in turn would be the engines of political transformation.
165 Despite the energy that African
Americans invested in trying to reshape the political system, African Americans continue to be
severely underrepresented in politics.
By democratic principle, it is unjust that minorities do not play a substantial role in the
political decision-making process. Yet, the American liberal tradition, individualistic in theory,
views politics as concerning the relationship between an individual and the state, “with little or no
room for groups in-between, other than as transient outgrowths of the combination of individual
interests.”
166 This individualistic focus provides little space for group-level concerns of
minorities.
167 This explains the resistance to opening up the American political system through
mechanisms such as proportional representation or cumulative voting that would empower
groups.
168 Lani Guinier was pilloried by conservatives in politics and the media for simply
suggesting that some alternative voting system such as one based on cumulative voting—a
commonly used voting mechanism in many corporations that is used to protect minority
shareholders—should be adopted in order that racial minorities may more effectively participate
in politics.
Majority groups often worry that granting rights to minority groups qua groups will fragment
the national fabric and undermine national unity.
169  Perhaps with this in mind, John Stuart Mill
claimed it would be “next to impossible” for real democracy to flourish in an ethnically diverse
society.
170 Mill’s response was to argue that a country’s boundaries be drawn along ethnic lines
and that national minorities be granted the right to secede.
171 These are not realistic alternatives
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for ethnically pluralistic western societies. The project for modern democracies is to learn to thrive
on heterogeneity.
Faith in assimilation has triumphed at the level of constitutional principle, yet ethnic minorities
continue to face obstacles to meaningful participation in ostensibly democratic states, including
the United States.
172 Despite noticeable gains since the 1960s, for example, African Americans
today hold less than 2 percent of elected offices throughout the country.
173 To a striking degree,
large portions of the American landscape remain geographically segregated by race. In fact,
Douglass Massey and Nancy Denton show that racial segregation of housing has worsened in this
century. One-third of African Americans live in areas so intensely segregated that they are almost
completely isolated from other groups in society, rendering them amongst “the most isolated
people on earth.”
174
3.2 LANDOWNERSHIP IN A PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY
Just as participatory democracy has both instrumental and intrinsic value, an enduring liberal
political tradition sees landownership as a vehicle for human development, not just an instrument
for economic development.
175 Yet the structure of the common law tenancy in common is
undemocratic. Minority interest holders may terminate the tenancy against the wishes of the
majority interest holders. In these instances, the minority interest holders have more power than
their proportional share of the tenancy suggests is fair. Although many property theorists connect
property rights and political and economic participation in society, few have specifically
considered, however, how minority landownership might make democracy more inclusive.
John Locke maintains that property ownership is essential to civil society.
176  People enter into
political or civil societies primarily to preserve property, he argues, defined in this context as
“Lives, Liberties and Estates.”
177 Elsewhere, Locke asserts that the “chief matter of property is
the Earth itself,” that is, land.
178 Locke’s theory of the social compact assumes that those with
valuable material possessions—most importantly land—have the strongest incentive to enter into
agreements to establish governments given their desire to preserve their property. Further, once
governments are formed, people should retain their property if civil society is to serve its ends.
Locke asserts:
The Supream Power cannot take from any Man any part of His property without his own consent.
For the preservation of Property being the end of Government, and that for which Men enter into
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Society, it necessarily supposes and requires, that the People should have Property, without which
they must be suppos’d to lose that by entring into Society, which was the end for which they entered
into it, too gross an absurdity for any Man to own. Men therefore in Society having Property, they
have such a right to the goods, which by the Law of the Community are theirs, that no Body hath
a right to take their substance, or any part of it from them, without their own consent; without this,
they have no Property at all.
179
Ownership, therefore, also means a stake in sustaining a viable political sphere.
 Locke qualifies the right to private property in two ways. First, he maintains that an
individual’s right to property is subject to the principle that there must be “enough, and as good
left in common for others.”
180 Second, Locke maintains that an individual cannot take more
property than he can use.
181 Even so, Locke’s principal interest lay in setting forth moral and
philosophical arguments to support the right to private property, and his ideas were used by
Anglo-American politicians to support the property rights of the rich, irrespective of these
provisos.
182 Moreover, Locke’s arguments for property address the conditions under which
individuals initially acquire property rights that become subject to governmental protection, but
do not ask whether the distribution of property at any moment in time reflects the fact that
different individuals and groups possess unequal power to acquire property in the first instance.
183
Locke’s political theory of property powerfully influenced the framers of the U.S.
Constitution, as well as early American jurists.
184 Thomas Jefferson, for one, fully accepted
Locke’s view of the sanctity of private property rights.
185 Jefferson, however, was relatively more
concerned about democratic principles than Locke, a concern that shaped his civic republican view
of the proper distribution of land. According to republicans, democracy works best if citizens are
enlightened and independent. For Jefferson, private property was “a corollary to democracy”
because landownership allowed men to achieve economic security and to develop self-reliance.
186
Believing that the “small land holders are the most precious part of a state,”
187 Jefferson thought
that as many men as possible should own land. Jefferson’s argument for widely distributed
property is also linked to his view of the good society. Agriculture, for Jefferson, held sociological
and moral value that was even more important than its economic value.
188 Freed from the
corrupting influence of industry and commerce, rural smallholds could help develop virtues that
would protect the moral fiber of the country and ensure its longevity.
189
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One hundred fifty years later in 1935, in his book Black Reconstruction,
190 W.E.B. Du Bois
focused upon the failure of the government to allocate land to the freedmen in explaining the
failure of Reconstruction to build a real democracy. The enfranchisement of black people in the
South after the Civil War was stripped of its liberating potential, he argued, because white
landowners maintained their monopoly of land.
191 Although black people used their political power
to establish public school systems, Du Bois asserted that “universal suffrage could not function
without personal freedom, land and education.”
192 As a socialist thinker, Du Bois considered
incomplete the popular black demand for private ownership of land (and little else) in the
economic realm.
193 But even so, Du Bois believed that black people in possession of a land base
could achieve a measure of economic independence that would give meaning to the right to
vote.
194 In the end, according to Du Bois, white resistance to ceding land to blacks, “spelled for
[black people] the continuation of slavery.”
195
The self-determination underpinnings of Du Bois’s philosophy were echoed thirty years later
during the height of the civil rights struggle.
196 Leaders of the Black Power movement challenged
as misguided the agendas of white liberals and black civil rights leaders. Single-minded efforts to
increase social-welfare spending as a means to achieve social uplift for black people would fall
short, they predicted. Instead, they argued that black people should work toward self-
determination, not just increased participation in mainstream politics. And they believed that more
energy should be spent developing and supporting black institutions controlled by black people.
197
Important amongst these were economic institutions that could assure autonomy, just as Jefferson
had argued.
Comparative studies demonstrate the link between land and participation
The political theories of “democratic property” have been tested in social science case studies that
document the links between land and many measures of community well-being and empowerment.
Complex social networks develop around particular pieces of land for communities defined
by continuity rather than mobility. Thus land and place are important to working-class and poor,
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minority communities in ways not common to mobile, middle-class communities.
198 One study of
a working-class, Italian-American community in the West End of Boston displaced in an urban
redevelopment project underscores the point that certain groups need property rights in order to
maintain a healthy sense of group identity. Not only were complex sets of social networks
localized within the particular area of the West End from which the residents were displaced, but
most residents also considered the entire area “as an extension of home” and constructed their
identity around this extended home.
Social science studies demonstrate that in African American communities, too, landownership
promotes community well-being. Landownership has been correlated with increased civic
participation,
199 psychological well-being,
200 and enhanced sense of community.
201 Landownership
can also benefit families and communities, irrespective of any measurable economic benefits to
particular individuals.
202 Even those extended community members who “return home” only
periodically may draw psychological strength from the very existence of the rooted community.
203
But because those who own land have greater security than those who rent or work for wages,
family landholdings may induce more family members to remain in relative proximity to one
another. The land itself can provide the base upon which to build institutions geared to community
development.
204 This focus on land as a base for community infrastructure extrapolates from the
classical liberal view that landownership is uniquely important to the protection of individual
liberty interests. To this end, Robert Ellickson has stated:
“Compared to other resources, land remains a particularly potent safeguard of individual liberty.
Like no other resource, land can provide a physical haven to which a beleaguered individual can
retreat.”
205
Just as land can shelter the “beleaguered individual,” it provides a physical base for groups trying
to improve their collective lot.
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As indicated, families that own land often build mutually beneficial support systems based
around the land. One study comparing differences in the systems of informal support between
equally poor, landowning and landless elderly black people in the Piedmont region of North
Carolina
206 demonstrated that a greater percentage of the children of the sharecroppers moved far
away from their parents (often to northern cities) than did the children of landowners. The elderly
sharecroppers were more often left to fend for themselves.
207 By contrast, over two-thirds of the
landed households in the case study lived on “compounds” in which children or other relatives
resided on the land itself or in the immediate vicinity. In these compounds, the children/relatives
and the black elders established “reciprocal exchange relationships” that benefited each person tied
to the land in some meaningful way.
In addition to particular rural black families, whole communities of African Americans have
been strengthened through landownership. Dating back to the early days after the Civil War,
African American families and individuals formed rural land collectives either on their own or with
the assistance of the government. For example, freedmen in Hampton, Virginia, formed the
Lincoln’s Land Association and cooperatively purchased hundreds of acres of land that groups of
families then collectively worked.
208 During the Depression, the Resettlement Administration and
the Farm Security Administration established several, rural communities for destitute, low-income
families.
209 If measured by a survivorship rate, the African American communities would not
appear to have been very successful; most did not last even a generation. Yet, these communities
greatly improved the life chances of the individuals involved. According to Lester Salamon, many
poor tenants (through lease-purchase agreements) gained the chance to become landowners in the
newly created communities replete with schools, cooperative enterprises, and other community
buildings.
210 Many program participants who purchased land expressed increased self-esteem.
211
The landowners were also much more active in their communities than were tenants as measured
by such indicia as relative participation in social and religious organizations, voter registration, and
voting turnout.
212
The Prairie Farms project in western Alabama is a good example of the community-building
potential of land-based communities. The Resettlement Administration designed this program to
settle destitute and low-income tenant families on approximately 3,000 acres in Macon County,
Alabama.
213 Each of the 34 families that were settled at Prairie Farms was provided with a
farmstead. The cooperative living at Prairie Farms “centered on farming, and the education and
social activities that revolved around agriculture.”
214 The farm families shared livestock for
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breeding, set aside a community pasture for common use, and cooperatively used certain
machinery and equipment.
The newly constructed school became a major center of community life at Prairie Farms. As
the first school to provide a high school education for black students in the surrounding area, the
school enrolled 213 students from the very beginning although it was built with a capacity of just
175 students.
215 The school offered the children many enrichment opportunities including the
ability to join the school newspaper, a student cooperative, and a number of clubs ranging from
the 4-H club to the nature club.
216 Further, the school held adult education classes focusing on
agriculture.
217 The school also doubled as the community center where meetings, plays, religious
services, and public health programs were held.
218
Although many of the African American communities formed by the Resettlement
Administration and the Farm Security Administration did not endure, one must remember that
these projects were started during the Depression, a particularly turbulent period of history.
219 And
the African American resettlement communities suffered from differential treatment in the form
of lesser funding than white farm-settlement communities established during the same period by
the same governmental programs. However, the people who had the opportunity to live within
these communities clearly benefited. As Robert Zabawa and Sarah Warren have stated:
[Prairie Farms] was an exercise in the community based on change. There was a change in the
relationship to the land: from tenancy and shares to ownership. There was a change in the
relationship to production: from cotton to diversified farming. There was a change in the economic
relationships: from dependency on the plantation owner and store to cooperative buying and selling.
There was a change in the relationship to education: from sporadic elementary education to high
school level offerings and adult education. And there was a change in the relationship to
community: from cabins scattered along an eroded wasteland, to new houses in a farming
community with a health and community center. This is what Prairie Farms had to offer.
220
Another real-world perspective on the importance of landownership to disadvantaged
communities can be gleaned from comparing indigenous populations in North America. Despite
their relatively impoverished status, Native Americans within the United States are more politically
self-determining and economically developed than Indians in either Canada or Mexico.
221 Studies
of American Indian communities demonstrate a strong link between self-governance and social and
economic development.
222 With reservations that dwarf the landholdings of most Indian groups
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in Canada and Mexico, American Indian tribes in the United States have a base upon which their
sovereign powers can be meaningfully expressed and organized.
223
 The historical record of federal Indian policy amply demonstrates the link between Native
American social welfare and landholding. With the passage of the Dawes Act in 1887, Congress
shifted its Indian policy from containing Indians within reservations to promoting assimilation of
Indians into American society, principally through transferring huge tracts of Indian land to whites
and forcing private ownership upon individual Indians.
224 Just as previous, smaller-scale
experiments in allotting Indian land had largely failed to achieve their stated goals,
225 widespread
application of the allotment policy under the Dawes Act devastated many Native American
communities.
226
Native Americans lost millions of acres of land that was declared surplus under the Dawes
Act.
227 In addition, two-thirds of all the land allotted to individual Indians under the Dawes Act—
roughly 27 million acres—ended up in non-Indian hands by 1934, mostly by means of sale,
mortgage foreclosure, and tax sale, after restrictions on alienation initially built into the Dawes Act
were rapidly stripped away, beginning with passage of the Burke Act in 1906.
228 Although the
destruction of communal tenure and its impact on Native American communities under the Dawes
Act is well documented, the plight of those Indians who lost their individual allotments was no less
damning of the policy. On most reservations that were allotted,
229 between 75 and 100 percent of
Indians who received fee patents lost their lands in short measure, and the overwhelming majority
of these Indians became impoverished.
230 Although the Dawes Act was lauded upon its enactment
as a vehicle to civilize Indians through private property ownership,
231 as land quickly passed out
of Indian hands and these Indians slipped into poverty, champions of the allotment policy shifted
their support to grounds of social Darwinism. Impoverished Indians would be forced to learn the
value of hard work and money.
232 
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The Catawba tribe provides a poignant example of the fundamental importance of
landownership. Prior to contact with white settlers, the Catawbas occupied a vast tract of land in
an area that now constitutes much of present-day North and South Carolina.
233 Under the terms
of two treaties—executed in 1760 and 1763, respectively—between the tribe and the King of
England, the Catawbas relinquished aboriginal territory in exchange for undisturbed ownership of
a 144,000-acre tract of land located within South Carolina.
After the Revolutionary War, South Carolina acceded to pressures from land-hungry white
settlers and enacted a series of statutes authorizing non-Indians to lease Catawba land in
contravention of the Nonintercourse Act.
234 At the time of the first leases with non-Indians, the
Catawbas were “‘then strong and felt themselves in their own greatness’”;
235 by the 1830s,
practically all of the land reserved to the tribe under treaty had been leased to non-Indians on terms
highly disadvantageous to the Catawbas.
236 Like so many other Indian tribes, the once-strong
Catawbas were reduced to a pathetic shadow of their former selves 30 years after first transferring
some of their property rights to white settlers. In a “state of starvation and distress,” the tribe
finally acquiesced to South Carolina’s repeated efforts to purchase all of their land.
237
Just as the loss of a land base contributed to the demise of the Catawba tribe, the Catawbas
experienced a resurgence after the federal government—concerned about the tribe’s sinking
fortunes
238—placed into trust approximately 3,500 acres of land for their benefit in the 1940s.
239
From the brink of starvation, the Catawbas recovered so rapidly that within fifteen years of
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obtaining a new land base and various other forms of federal assistance,
240 the government
determined that the Catawbas were one of the twelve tribes in the period between 1954 and
1962
241 who were suitable candidates for the withdrawal of federal assistance and services under
the termination policy.
242
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4. LEGAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF THE LINK BETWEEN
LAND AND COMMUNITY
Though the theoretical link predicted between landownership and enhanced minority civic
participation has been proven on the ground, legal recognition of the importance of minority
landholding to building community and increasing democratic participation has been “fragmentary”
at best.
243 Only federal Indian law explicitly recognizes that promoting landownership is necessary
to self-determination for minority groups who otherwise face systematic discrimination. Outside
of the Indian context, neither common law nor statutes acknowledge the value of minority
landownership.
This section illustrates the degree to which the law has supported (or not supported) minority
landownership by considering the intersection of minority landownership and the law in two
instances: (1) current federal Indian law policy and case law, and (2) Fifth Amendment takings
jurisprudence. Further, and by way of comparison, this section considers the lawfulness of
restraints on alienation as they pertain to relatively newer forms of common property. In the
context of condominiums, housing cooperatives, and similar forms of residential ownership both
statutory and common law permit groups to restrain individual rights in order to promote
“community.”
4.1 MODERN FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY RECOGNIZES THAT INDIAN
LANDOWNERSHIP PROMOTES INDIAN CULTURE AND COMMUNITY,
DESPITE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY’S TEPID VINDICATION OF THIS POLICY
In the past century, federal Indian policy has oscillated between recognition of tribes as sovereign
entities with primary responsibility for managing their resources and attempts to strip Indians of
their land and cultural resources in order to facilitate assimilation.
244 The modern policy, set largely
by Congress and the president,
245 seeks to promote tribal autonomy. President Lyndon Johnson
helped steer away from the assimilationist policies of termination and relocation that predominated
in the 1940s and 1950s. Yet President Richard Nixon is credited with setting a course that
emphasizes “tribal self-determination, sovereignty, and control over Indian country.”
246 President
Bill Clinton publicly supports a “government-to-government” relationship between the United
States and Indian tribes and Congress now promotes greater tribal control of Indian land.
247
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Today, federal Indian policy supports retention of Indian lands in Indian hands. The roots of
this policy lie in the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
248 and the philosophy of John Collier, the
charismatic commissioner of Indian Affairs who served in this role between 1933 and 1945.
249 In
developing a program that became known as the Indian New Deal,
250 Collier drew upon the 1928
Meriam Report.
251 This report set forth “in scientific survey style, the staggering degree of
poverty, ill health, poor education, and community disorganization that generally prevailed on the
reservations.”
252 The report denounced the allotment program, supported efforts to strengthen
Indian communities, and advocated increased protection of Indian property rights.
253
Consistent with these recommendations, specific provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act
nullified and reversed the federal government’s century-old mission to assimilate Native Americans
by breaking up tribal property holdings into individual interests.
254 Section one of the act ends any
further allotment of reservations.
255 Section two extends trust restrictions on allotments
indefinitely.
256 Section five authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to acquire additional lands to
be put into trust for Indian tribes.
257 Since implementation of these provisions, Native American
landholdings have increased moderately.
258
Today, American Indian land retention is promoted by a number of federal statutes that
subject much of tribal and individually owned land to restraints on alienation. The Indian
Nonintercourse Act,
259 25 U.S.C. § 462
260 and 25 U.S.C. § 464,
261 are amongst the more
important such statutes.
262 Congress even maintained the federal restraints on alienation when it
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enacted Public Law 280 in 1953, which permitted states to assume civil and criminal jurisdiction
over Indian country.
263
The rationale for federal restraints on alienation of Indian land has developed over time. In
order to federalize the process of Indian land cessions, Congress first imposed pervasive restraints
on alienation of Indian land in 1790 in the first in a series of Trade and Intercourse Acts.
264 Ever
since, restraints on alienation of Indian land have been a cornerstone of federal Indian policy.
265
When restraints on alienation were first established 200 years ago, Congress was not primarily
concerned with slowing the loss of Indian land.
266 Tribes were largely a pawn in a power struggle
for supremacy between the federal government and the states; the shifting of power from the states
to the federal government in the area of Indian affairs represents one step in the federal
government’s gradual rise to political supremacy.
267 In addition to consolidating its power in the
area of Indian affairs as provided for in the Constitution,
268 Congress enacted the Nonintercourse
Act in order prevent Indian uprisings
269 because under the Articles of Confederation, the “duplicity
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Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encumbrance, or taxation of any real or personal
property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian tribe, band, or community that is held in trust by the
United States or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or shall authorize
regulation of the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty, agreement, or statute
or with any regulation made pursuant thereto; or shall confer jurisdiction upon the State to adjudicate, in
probate proceedings or otherwise, the ownership or right to possession of such property or any interest
therein.
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§ 12, 4 Stat. 730.
265 Robert N. Clinton and Margaret Tobey Hotopp, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Restraints on Alienation
of Indian Land: The Origins of the Eastern Land Claims, 31 ME. L. REV. 17, 19, 38 (1979). See also Mountain States
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dissenting); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 470 U.S. 226, 247–8 (1985); Oneida Indian Nation
of New York v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667–70 (1974); United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103, 109–11
(1935); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1, 17 (1831); Johnson and Graham’s Lessee v. McIntosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 591,
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269 Mashpee Tribe v. Watt, 542 F. Supp. 797, 803 (D. Mass. 1982), aff’d 707 F.2d 23 (1
st Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 853 (1984); see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL LAW, supra note 58, at 508; Clinton & Hotopp, supra
note 264, at 36; FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE YEARS 42–50 (1970).41
and lack of uniformity in the states’ handling of Indian land cessions were primary sources of
Indian hostilities.”
270
In this century courts have construed the Nonintercourse Act and other restraints on
alienation of Indian land as designed to protect Indians from being dispossessed of their land by
parties other than the federal government.
271 However, judges in earlier cases often considered
whether restraints on alienation of Indian land were applicable in a particular case against the
backdrop of “the Government’s paternal policy toward the Indians. . . .”
272 These judges viewed
Indians as doltish, incompetent, or—at least—incapable of managing their own affairs. For
example, in United States v. Candelaria,
273 the Supreme Court considered, inter alia, whether
land owned by the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico was subject to federal restraints on alienation.
In determining that the lands owned by the Pueblos in fee simple were subject to the restraints, the
Court first considered the purpose of the statutory restraints, including those set forth in the
Nonintercourse Act. The court stated that:
“Many provisions have been enacted by Congress—some general and others special—to prevent
the Government’s Indian wards from improvidently disposing of their lands and becoming homeless
public charges.”
274
Next, the Court considered whether the Pueblo—who owned their land in fee simple, unlike many
other tribes—were subject to the Nonintercourse Act by asking whether the Pueblo were capable
enough to fend off those who might dispossess them of their land. The Court viewed the Pueblo
as different from the “nomadic and savage Indians then living in New Mexico,”
275 but as markedly
inferior to more advanced races. The Court characterized the Pueblos as follows:
“Although sedentary, industrious and disposed to peace, they are Indians in race, customs and
domestic government, always have lived in isolated communities, and are a simple, uninformed
people, ill-prepared to cope with the intelligence and greed of other races.”
276
Based on this obviously racist characterization, the Court subjected the Pueblos’ landholdings to
the federal restraints.
277
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277 Federal courts demonstrated this same paternal attitude toward individual Indians who held allotments subject
to restraints on alienation. In United States v. Debell, 227 F. 775 (8
th Cir. 1915), the Eighth Circuit Court voided a sale
of an allotment from an illiterate Indian woman to a white speculator. The court described the purposes of the federal
restraints as follows:
The chief purpose and main object of the restriction upon alienation is not to prevent the incompetent Indian
from selling his land for a price too low, but to prevent him from selling it at all, to the end that he shall be
prevented from losing, giving away, or squandering its proceeds and thus be left dependent upon the
government or upon charity for his support.
Id. at 776.42
Federal courts no longer claim that restraints on alienation are necessary to protect lowly
Indians from making improvident decisions. Instead, according to some judges, the restraints
remain in place because policymakers believe that a substantial land base must be maintained in
order for Indians to preserve their culture and for Indian communities to exercise self-
determination.
278 In this light, land represents more than a fungible commodity capable of creating
wealth for individual Indians. Indian land is not to be subject to the full force of the market
because it represents a patrimony or political heritage. As one commentator has stated:
 If the only purpose for federal restrictions were “to protect the Indians from themselves,” the
character of the restrictions would be transitory, ceasing when the trust beneficiary had become
sufficiently “educated” or “assimilated” to stand alone. Moreover, there would be less objection to
transmuting the character of the trust; reservation land could be liquidated into money or corporate
securities, for example, so long as the Secretary monitored the fairness of the exchange and
continued to administer the new trust corpus to ensure that no waste occurred. If, rather, the
objective of the federal trust responsibility is to provide a land and resource base for a distinct
Indian society as long as tribes wish to preserve that society, sale of reservation land should not take
place, even at a fair price, or at least should be tightly controlled.
279
Although a great portion of the American Indian landholdings remain subject to federal restraints
on alienation, Congress has unilateral power to remove the restrictions on tribal or individually
owned land.
280 American Indians lost a great deal of land when restrictions were removed during
the allotment era and the termination era. Recently, the Supreme Court has maintained that
congressional transfer of land without restraints on alienation to Alaska Natives indicates that
Congress does not value maintaining these native communities intact.
In Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government,
281 the Supreme Court considered
whether the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government could tax the State of Alaska and a
private contractor for conducting business on tribal land. In order to determine this, the Court had
to decide whether the community of native Neets’aii Gwich’in in Alaska could be considered to
be “dependent Indian communities” under 18U.S.C. § 1151
282 after passage of the Alaska Native
Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA).
283 Although the Neets’aii Gwich’in’s reservation was revoked
in 1971 pursuant to ANCSA, in 1973, two native corporations formed for the tribe took title to
the former reservation land under a provision in ANCSA that permitted native corporations to do
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so provided that these corporations would forego the statute’s other monetary payments and land
transfers.
284
Although the tribe’s land was “exempt from adverse possession claims, real property taxes,
and certain judgments as long as it . . . [was] not sold, leased or developed,”
285 ANCSA did not
provide that former reservation land could be acquired by native corporations subject to federal
restraints on alienation. The Court considered the fact that ANCSA did not provide that former
reservation land acquired by a native corporation would be subject to restraints on alienation as
an indication that Congress did not intend to use its power to preserve native communities intact.
The Court stated that:
. . . ANCSA transferred reservation lands to private, state-chartered Native corporations, without
any restraints on alienation or significant use restrictions, and with the goal of avoiding ‘any
permanent racially defined institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations’. By ANCSA’s very design,
Native corporations can immediately convey former reservation lands to non-Natives, and such
corporations are not restricted to using those lands for Indian purposes. Because Congress
contemplated that non-Natives could own the former Venetie Reservation, and because the Tribe
is free to use it for non-Indian purposes, we must conclude that the federal set-aside requirement
is not met.
286
Although federal policy now supports Indian landownership, the federal judiciary has not fully
supported the modern policy.
287 The courts over the past three decades increasingly conflate
Indian sovereignty and Indian property rights, two concepts that are analytically distinct and are
treated as such in non-Indian contexts.
288 In short, the courts recognize Indian power to govern
only the land owned by tribal members or entities, even within the territorial boundaries of the
reservation. Thus, fee ownership of land by tribal members or entities on Indian reservations has
grown in importance as tribes seek to preserve their sovereign powers. In 1989, for example, the
Supreme Court held that tribal governments may not exercise zoning authority over certain fee
land owned by nontribal members located within a reservation.
289
The demographic make-up of an Indian reservation can determine not only the extent of a
tribe’s sovereign powers, but in some instances the very physical boundaries of a reservation. In
a series of cases involving allotment-era statutes, federal courts have decided whether Congress
intended to diminish or terminate a reservation by passing surplus land acts that opened
reservations to non-Indian settlers. The legal question raised in diminishment cases “constitutes
a uniquely historical issue”
290 given that the drafters of the surplus land acts assumed that Indians
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would assimilate into society within a generation after the reservations were opened and did not
foresee that the reservations would continue to exist as a result of the New Deal Indian
Reorganization Act.
291 Even so, courts have gone through the exercise of “determining”
congressional intent by fine parsing of language used in different surplus land acts.
Aware that an effort to deduce Congress’s intent to diminish or preserve a reservation based
on the contemporaneous record is a largely formalistic exercise untethered from reality, courts
now also examine the “subsequent jurisdictional history,”
292 including the demographic
composition of the opened lands.
293 At root, the focus in the cases on the demographic make-up
of a community reflects the judiciary’s anxiousness to protect the non-Indian’s “justifiable
expectations” that they should not fall under the jurisdiction of tribal government.
294 Where
Indians remain a significant part of the population in the opened part of the reservation, courts
have held that the reservation remained intact.
295 In cases where a majority of the population on
the opened land consists of non-Indians, courts have determined that the reservation has been
either diminished or terminated.
296 If sovereignty remains the key to Indian economic development,
and courts are increasingly limiting tribal sovereignty and even territory to land owned in fee by
either the tribe or its members, land ownership is vital.
297
4.2 IN TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE, JUDGES DO NOT CONSIDER THE
IMPORTANCE LAND MAY HAVE FOR MINORITY COMMUNITIES IN
CONSIDERING CONDEMNATION
In Fifth Amendment takings jurisprudence, courts have not balanced the public purpose a
governmental entity offers in its bid to condemn property by eminent domain against the
importance that the property holds for rooted communities, whether minority or majority.
298 In
1954, the Supreme Court held that a state’s eminent domain power was coterminous with the
state’s police powers.
299 Thirty years later, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
300 the Court
held that the exercise of eminent domain power need be rationally related only to achieving a
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public purpose, and the means chosen to effect the articulated public purpose be merely rational.
301
Together, Berman and Midkiff vest state and federal authorities with almost unlimited power to
condemn property provided the government pays just compensation, no matter whether the
property could be characterized as fungible or “property for personhood.” Further, in comparing
the two cases, in the later Midkiff case the Court focused less attention on the public use rationale.
In Berman the Court made a nominal effort to address the manner in which the community as a
whole may have benefited from the taking;
302 in Midkiff the Court did not view a taking that would
transfer property from one private individual to another as inconsistent with the public use
requirement because “‘it is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable
portion, . . . directly enjoy or participate in any improvement’” for the taking to be considered for
the public use.
303 Of course, the use of the eminent domain power by a governmental entity does
not always signify that land will be distributed away from the poor to the more wealthy; in fact,
the state intervention in Midkiff redistributed land in favor of those with fewer rights in land.
In takings jurisprudence, urban renewal and highway projects highlight the lack of judicial
attention to the value that land may have for minority communities.  The urban renewal programs
were initiated first under the Housing Act of 1949;
304 several highway projects were undertaken
soon thereafter. Together, these projects displaced a tremendous number of people throughout
the country and devastated poor and minority communities within many different cities.
A finding that an urban renewal or highway program will destroy or severely damage a
community, however, provides no legal basis for halting such a program. In a 1967 case, Nashville
I-40 Steering Committee v. Ellington,
305 the district court judge denied an application for a
temporary injunction filed by a community group seeking to halt a highway program that would
adversely impact a mostly African American community in Nashville, Tennessee, despite a finding
that the community’s concerns were legitimate. As the court of appeals noted:
“[T]he blocking of other streets will result in a heavy increase in traffic through the campus of Fisk
University and Meharry Medical College. A public park used predominantly by Negroes will be
destroyed. Many business establishments owned by Negroes will have to be relocated or closed.”
306
Relying in part on Berman, the Sixth Circuit held that the courts could not halt the project because
the “minimizing of hardships and adverse economic effects is a problem addressing itself to
engineers, not judges.”
307
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Residential communities, common property, and restrictions on alienation
The body of statutory and common law rules governing the different forms of group ownership
of real property is designed to advance specific economic or social policies. Even in private law
doctrine, by allocating power between individuals and the group, policymakers make certain
tradeoffs between promoting liberty and fairness.
308 As applied to some forms of common-law
group ownership, specifically, the tenancy in common, the liberty interests of individuals prevail
as against the ownership group; in other forms of common ownership such as the condominium,
the law enhances the rights of the group as a whole at the expense of the individual. The laws that
have developed to implement these latter policies subject the use and disposition of the property
to group control—whether property owned in common by all the members of the group or
property that individual members of the group own in some measure individually, but acquire
subject to a group-ownership scheme.
309 Even in those instances in which groups have the power
to curtail individual property rights of those within the group scheme, the law ensures that these
individuals have the right to exit the group on reasonable terms.
From the initial development of common law rules prohibiting direct restraints on the
alienation of property held in fee simple to the gradual loosening of such rules in certain instances,
this is an area of law heavily determined by public policies. Initially, the rule against restraints on
alienation developed to promote primarily economic ends. As background, establishment of the
right to convey property as one of the essential incidents of fee simple ownership can be traced
to the British Parliament’s enactment of the Statute Quia Emptores in 1290.
310 The statute
established the principle of the free alienation of possessory estates and marked the beginning of
the end of the feudal system.
311 In the shift from feudalism to market economies, as the free
alienation of land came to be viewed as essential to fostering economic and commercial
development, English courts established common law rules prohibiting direct restraints on
alienation.
312 Absolute restraints on the alienation of a fee simple interest, whether labeled as a
disabling, forfeiture, or promissory restraint under the traditional classifications, came to be held
void in all instances.
313
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In addition to the predominant economic justification for the rule against restraints on
alienation, some courts and commentators suggest the rule serves a political purpose. Greater
alienability of land serves a decentralized market system that in theory promotes the values of
democracy by preventing concentration of land (and the wealth it represents) in a hereditary
aristocracy.
314 Subjecting concentrated wealth in the hands of dynastic families to market pressures
promotes democratic ends. Providing for unrestricted rights of alienation under all circumstances,
however, does not always increase democratic participation, to the extent that such goals are
promoted by landownership. In fact, unfettered rights of alienation may in some circumstances
redistribute property away from people with fewer resources to those with more resources. To this
end, Joseph Singer writes that:
Under some market conditions, alienability may actually concentrate ownership in the hands of the
wealthy since such corporations or individuals are able to bid higher amounts for property and may
thereby induce others to sell. Restraints on alienation of low-income housing, for example, may
serve to ensure its continued availability to poor families.
315
The rule against restraints on alienation is policy driven, and “[c]ompeting policy
considerations . . . have, almost from the inception of the rule, caused exceptions to be carved out
of it.”
316 According to one court in a leading case, the development of the rules against restraints
on alienation “is not a mathematical science but takes shape at the direction of social and economic
forces in an ever changing society. . . .”
317 As it pertains to various forms of group ownership of
real property, the economic policy underlying the dislike for restraints on alienation often collides
with policies or practices that support the social and economic interests of groups or political goals
of civic participation.
The value the law assigns to stable group ownership under a particular form of ownership can
be measured in part by the degree to which the law allows the group to restrict the rights of
individual members to alienate property interests. Depending upon the form of ownership, the law
accords groups greater or lesser ability to restrict the individual member’s powers to alienate. In
more specialized cases, the law may provide one group with more authority than another group
vis-à-vis restricting the right of individual alienation, despite the fact that both groups own
property under the same form of ownership.
Some groups come to own land through consensual agreements, such as condominiums;
others come together through the operation of the law, as in the case of groups that acquire land
under the rules of intestacy. Where common ownership arises by intestacy, the law assigns the
group a form of ownership, the tenancy in common, that is not very “group friendly.” If the law
makes it difficult for a group to change the form of ownership under which it owns property from
one that permits the group little power to restrain the rights of alienation of the group’s individual
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members to one that is more “group friendly,” the law effectively adjudges stability within the
particular community as unimportant. The same analysis applies to situations in which the law
prevents a group that owns property under a form of ownership that permits few restraints on
alienation from establishing its own set of rules regulating entry and exit into or from the group
that diverge from the default rules under the particular form of ownership. Such barriers to private
ordering also promote unstable ownership.
The following discussion reveals that with respect to condominiums, cooperatives, and similar
forms of residential ownership the law allows property-owning groups to limit the rights of
individual owners to alienate their property interests in order to promote “community.” Judicial
recognition of the overriding value of community in this context contrasts starkly with the
unbounded economic values of individual wealth maximization that drive the common law rules
governing partition of tenancies in common in most circumstances.
In recent times, legislatures and judges have created liberal exceptions to the rule against
restraints on alienation “in connection with sales of residential property, particularly condominiums
and cooperatives, and on the transfer of corporate stock.”
318 In terms of forms of common
ownership developed to meet the demand for residential housing, courts give credence to the
social and economic justifications offered by the group seeking to impose the restraints (typically
on transfers of ownership interests and use) even though the restraints cause economic harm to
individuals. Although some courts engage in a rigorous analysis of the proffered purposes for the
restraints, other courts accept bare assertions that the challenged restraints serve a beneficial
purpose for the community of residential owners or society as a whole.
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Some of the most important decisions limiting application of the rules against restraints on
alienation as applied to residential communities generally have been made in the context of
cooperative housing schemes. In a cooperative housing arrangement, the members of the
cooperative own stock in a nonprofit corporation, and such stock ownership entitles a member to
occupy individual apartments.
320 In this type of cooperative housing structure, just as in tenancy
in common, the members of the cooperative are financially interdependent. The Restatement on
Property states that:
It is essential to the financial stability of such a corporation that the members each contribute their
share of the taxes, maintenance and mortgage expenses of the premises, because the only source
of corporate income is usually the assessments levied on individual member-stockholders, and the
entire premises, including the interests of all the members of the corporation, are subject to
foreclosure sale in the event that the corporation defaults on its obligation.
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Due to such financial interdependence, the corporate bylaws of such cooperatives normally require
the board of directors or a majority of the members to consent to transfers of the lease and stock
of individual members.
322
 In the leading case of Penthouse Properties, Inc. v. 1158 Fifth Avenue, Inc.,
323 a case of first
impression in New York State, the court considered the lawfulness of a restraint on alienation that
required tenant owners of a cooperative apartment to receive approval from the board of directors
or from two-thirds of the stockholders prior to transferring stock ownership or assigning a lease.
In a decision upholding the restraints, the state court focused almost exclusively on the needs of
the group. The court considered “the residential nature of the enterprise, the privilege of selecting
neighbors and the needs of the community”
324 as important factors outweighing the need of
individual tenants for unfettered rights of alienation. In holding that “the special nature of the
ownership of co-operative apartment houses by tenant owners requires that they be not included
in the general rule against restraint on the sale of stock in corporations organized for profit,”
325
the court determined that there was a social value to promoting stable residential communities
organized under cooperative housing forms of ownership.
Twenty-one years later, the Supreme Court of Illinois considered the lawfulness of a restraint
on alienation in a suit against an association that developed and maintained a cooperative
subdivision “as a carefully planned, nonspeculative, attractive community.”
326 The challenged
restraint gave the association one year to purchase the interest of a member wishing to withdraw
from the association either at an agreed upon price or at a price set by an appraiser.
327 In
considering the restraint, the court established a broad rule for determining the lawfulness of
restraints on alienation that many courts throughout the country have followed. The court held
that:
“[T]he crucial inquiry should be directed at the utility of the restraint as compared with the injurious
consequences that will flow from its enforcement. If accepted social and economic considerations
dictate that a partial restraint is reasonably necessary for their fulfillment, such a restraint should
be sustained.”
328
Because the court believed that the restraints included in the membership agreements provided
“the only way to keep [such] co-operative housing co-operative,”
329 the court was faced, at least
implicitly, with weighing the value to society of such residential communities. Arguably, the
cooperative housing arrangement should be protected from the unchecked forces of the market
only if such residential communities serve some useful purpose for the society. In deciding that the
restraints were reasonable, the court recognized that legal instruments designed to promote
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stability within such communities serve important social ends—viz. creating stable residential
communities.
 Just as courts have recognized the societal value of communities organized into cooperative
housing developments, courts have determined that condominium arrangements represent an
increasingly important type of residential living.
330 Though individual members of a condominium
are not as financially interdependent as members of many housing cooperatives, courts have
determined that the same kinds of restraints on transfer and use that are upheld in cooperative
agreements are lawful when included in condominium agreements. In addressing the nature of
condominium living, the Florida appellate court wrote in a much-cited opinion:
“. . . inherent in the condominium concept is the principle that to promote the health, happiness, and
peace of mind of the majority of the unit owners since they are living in such close proximity and
using facilities in common, each unit owner must give up a certain degree of freedom of choice
which he might otherwise enjoy in separate, privately owned property.”
331
Instead of focusing on the financial sustainability of such communities, many courts consider
whether the restraints serve a state’s public policy goals or, more narrowly, contribute to
promoting the “community life” of the condominium community.
In 1989, in a case involving a publicly subsidized condominium development, the California
court of appeals upheld restrictive covenants designed to promote affordable housing for persons
of low and moderate income and to sustain a community of owner-occupiers.
332 In this case, the
private developers, who purchased the land from the City of Oceanside in order to construct
replacement dwellings for low- and moderate-income people displaced due to an urban renewal
project, agreed to covenants, conditions, and restrictions that required condominium owners to
occupy their units as their principal place of residence and prevented such owners from renting or
leasing their units.
333 The restrictions were to be maintained for ten years after completion of the
construction of the condominiums.
In upholding these restrictions, the appellate court first determined that in judging the
lawfulness of the restraint, “the court must balance the justifications for the restriction against the
quantum of the restraint” with more restrictive conditions requiring stronger justifications.
334 To
this end, the court viewed the restraints as consistent with the public policy of California to
promote affordable housing for all families within the state. The court maintained that the
restraints on alienation promoted the state policy because they directly “related to the stated
purposes of maintaining a stabilized community of low and moderate income residents and
discouraging speculation by real estate investors.”
335
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Although the California appellate court considered whether the restraints on alienation in
McKenna served public policy, other cases merely consider the needs of the community of
condominium owners. For example, the Florida appellate court considered the lawfulness of
restrictive conditions contained in a declaration of condominium that, like those in McKenna,
forbade unit owners from leasing their units, except for very limited time periods.
336 Although the
case did not involve affordable housing or any other noteworthy public policy of the state, the
court upheld the leasing restrictions because it viewed protecting the very character of the
condominium community as a reasonable goal. The court stated that:
Given the unique problems of condominium living in general and the special problems endemic to
a tourist oriented community in South Florida in particular, appellant’s avowed objective—to
inhibit transiency and to impart a certain degree of continuity of residence and a residential
character to their community—is, we believe, a reasonable one. . . . The attainment of this
community goal outweighs the social value of retaining for the individual unit owner the absolutely
unqualified right to dispose in any way and for such duration or purpose he alone so desires.
337
In some instances, courts seek to preserve the character of a particular community by
upholding restraints that limit the class of people that may purchase property in planned residential
developments from individual owners who would like to sell their property. For example, the
Florida court of appeals recently upheld restraints on alienation that sought to preserve the
character of a planned development for military officers.
338 The Indian River Colony Club
restricted prospective purchasers to members of the club—a club for people who had served in
the military as commissioned or chief warrant officers. In addition, the deeds contained a provision
that mandated the purchase price a property owner would be entitled to receive upon resale.
339
In terms of the restriction on the persons to whom they could sell their property, the court
noted that holding this restriction to be unreasonable would destroy the primary purpose of the
planned development, a development that was planned to serve a community of military officers.
As it pertains to the restriction that required owners to forego the right to sell their property at
market prices, however, the court merely parroted the language from the deed of restrictions that
stated that the restrictions were made “for the mutual and reciprocal benefit of each and every
residential lot and apartment in the subdivision.”
340
State courts throughout the country uphold restraints imposed upon owners who live in
residential developments because the courts seek to preserve and promote stable communities,
whether these are communities of people of low and moderate income or communities of former
military officers. Although the federal government’s history of dispossessing Indian tribes of their
land is well known, since the time of the Indian Reorganization Act the restrictions on alienation
of Indian-owned trust land have played a useful role in stemming land loss in the American Indian
community.
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5. PROPOSAL
Over the course of the past thirty years, the decline in rural black landholdings this century has
been called a “crisis” and black farmers have been referred to as an “endangered species” in reports
that exhibit an increasing tone of desperation. However one chooses to describe the phenomenon,
today the number of black farmers and the number of rural acres under black ownership stand at
historic lows for this century. If the losses are not reversed or at least halted, African Americans
will enter the twenty-first century effectively shut out of the agricultural sector as producers and
rural black people will own less land than rural black people owned in the years immediately
following the Civil War. Addressing the issue of land loss by itself, however, will not do much to
improve the standing of black farmers and rural landowners. At present, many rural African
Americans are not able to use land they own productively. As the Pigford lawsuit made plain,
many black farmers have been denied credit unlawfully. In other instances, African Americans who
hold an interest—no matter how large—in heir property have not been able to use the land as
collateral to secure financing to build homes or to improve their agricultural operations.
341
Just as the USDA and its county agents systematically discriminated against black farmers for
decades, driving many of these farmers out of business, meaningful policy reform must be just as
systematic and far-reaching.
342 Simply allowing some of the members of the Pigford class to
collect limited damages will do next to nothing to ensure that black people will have the
opportunity to participate as producers in the agricultural sector of the economy into the next
century. The moral imperative to redress fundamental acts of injustice applies with equal force to
those thousands of rural black landowners who lost their land due to the unethical, sometimes
illegal, practices of white attorneys and land speculators who used the rules governing partition
actions as a lever to force the sale of black-owned land.
Policymakers must take an organic approach to restoring meaningful ownership to rural
African Americans. Such an approach requires at least three elements: land consolidation, land
restoration, and community legal education. Further, both the state and federal government must
develop a policy directed at these three ends. In addition to these three core measures, federal and
state officials should assist African American landowners who own land of special historical
significance to place such land in trust. Protection of such African American land not only will help
the current owners and their descendants maintain ownership of such land, but also will provide
future generations of African Americans with an opportunity to keep alive and learn firsthand
about an important part of their heritage.
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Land consolidation initiatives could help improve the security of tenure of present heir-
property holders. At a bare minimum, the law should enable groups of African Americans who
hold heir property to reorganize their ownership of the land under rules that would not require
unanimous consent of all interest holders. If either a majority or a supermajority of the interests
in a tenancy in common is permitted to change the default rules governing the tenancy in common
or to convert to another form of ownership altogether, land can be managed more effectively to
the benefit of the majority.
Under such modified rules, the group could lawfully place restrictions on alienation of
individual interests of the type definitional of other common property forms such as the
condominium and the cooperative. These relatively newer forms of residential ownership—
together with their restrictions on alienation—are well established in law because they respond to
the demand in the market for community-oriented group living. Likewise, the law should
affirmatively recognize that the continued black ownership of rural lands serves a higher
purpose—it promotes a more democratic union.
In addition to helping African American landowners as a group stabilize their common
property holdings, the federal government should restore land to black farmers who lost their land
due to foreclosure by the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The settlement of the Pigford class
action lawsuit provides for limited land restoration, even in those cases in which the USDA played
a significant role in driving successful black farmers into bankruptcy. Such broader land restoration
would be consistent with the recent efforts made by countries such as South Africa to return land
to individuals and communities who lost their land due to unjust governmental actions in a prior
period in the country’s history.
Even if land is restored to African Americans or tenants in common are given the right to
reorganize their landownership under another, more stable form, poor landowners often do not
have access to lawyers who can help them manage their land effectively or fend off those who seek
to acquire ownership of their land against their wishes. Congress should expand the mission of
legal services to allow poor landowners access to legal-service lawyers. Such an expanded vision
would recognize that there is as much value in preventing those on the cusp of distress from falling
into the ranks of the economically disenfranchised as there is in trying to help those already
destitute survive on the margins.
The ensuing discussion develops each of the proposed policy reforms. However, given the
complexity of the heir property problem, it should be emphasized that an approach that solely
seeks to implement on one or two of these proposals will likely provide only temporary relief.
5.1 LAND CONSOLIDATION
In many parts of the world, rural land has fallen into unproductive use. This normally occurs once
the ownership becomes fragmented physically or the number of people or entities who may hold
a legal interest in the land grows beyond a certain critical point.
343 Such fragmentation of land or
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ownership or both often arises due to “the application of rigid inheritance rules.”
344 Clearly, the
heir property phenomenon in rural, African American communities and amongst American Indians
provides paradigmatic examples of fractionation caused, in part, by inheritance law.
In an effort to return such land to productive use, a number of countries have enacted land
consolidation legislation.
345 Under classic land consolidation, legislatures seek to aggregate
spatially fragmented landholdings into as few new consolidated holdings as possible.
346 In Norway,
at least, the law also enables those charged with consolidating the land to attempt to improve the
landownership pattern by introducing rules designed to improve cooperation between those
stakeholders with an interest in the land.
347 In all state-sponsored consolidation efforts, those
enacting or implementing land consolidation initiatives must balance the interests of the individual,
the landowners as a group, and of the society.
348 Even so, a fundamental principle underlying
consolidation is that no individual should suffer economic loss in the consolidation process.
349
Almost all proposals offered to cure the problem of fractionated, heir property in Indian
country and in the landholdings of rural blacks assume that the tenancy in common form must be
upheld. Much like “classic land consolidation” measures, these proposals seek to reduce the levels
of fractionation by aggregating the interests in particular parcels of heir property in order that
fewer people would retain a legal interest in the property. This may be done by intestacy reform,
350
modification of partition laws,
351 and changes in adverse possession laws.
352
                                                                                                                                                  
owners a right to exclude others from using the scarce resource. Heller claims that when “there are too many owners
holding rights of exclusion, the resource is prone to underuse—a tragedy of the anticommons”). 
344 Pedro Moral-López, PRINCIPLES OF LAND CONSOLIDATION LEGISLATION 115 (UN Food and Agriculture
Organization Legis. Study No. 3, 1962) (in collaboration with Erich H. Jacoby).
345 See, e.g., Jian-Ming Zhou, Land Consolidation in Japan and Other Rice-Based Economies Under Private
Landownership in Monsoon Asia, LAND REFORM, 1998/1, at 23 (primarily proposing changes to Japan’s land
consolidation initiatives); Torgeir Austenå, Agrarian Land Law in Norway, in AGRARIAN LAND LAW IN THE WESTERN
WORLD 134, 138–40 (Margaret Rosso Grossman & Wim Brussard eds., 1992); Philip Oldenburg, Land Consolidation
as Land Reform, in India, 18 WORLD DEV. 183 (1990); Otto Schiller, Aspects of Land Consolidation in Germany, in
LAND TENURE (Kenneth H. Parsons et al. eds., 1956).
346 Oldenburg, supra note 344, at 183.
347 Austenå, supra note 344, at 138–40.
348 Cf. Hans Sevatdal, Land Consolidation in Norway, pp. 1–2 (unpublished paper delivered at the Conference
on Subdivision, Redesign and Neighborhood Pooling, Fort Myers, Florida (1986)) (on file with author). Particular
national policies and the needs of the national economy provide the basic framework for government officials vested with
authority to consolidate private landholdings. See Austenå, supra note 344, at 138–40.
349 Oldenburg, supra note 344, at 183. Put differently, Oldenburg states that “while land consolidation programs
reallocate land, they require the preservation of the distribution of wealth in land.” Id. at 14 (emphasis in original). See
also cf. Hugo A. Pearce, III, Note, “Heirs’ Property”: The Problem, Pitfalls and Possible Solutions, 25 S.C. L. REV.
151, 157–8 (1973).
350 See, e.g., Williams, supra note 95, at 726–7 (1971) (highlighting some of the intestacy reform proposals offered
to solve the problem of heir property for American Indians).
351 See, e.g., Chris Kelley, Stemming the Loss of Black Owned Farmland Through Partition Action—A Partial
Solution, 1985 ARK. L. NOTES 35 (1985). Kelley proposes that in partition actions in Arkansas, tenants in common who
do not wish to sell their interests be given the right to purchase the interests of those who indicate a willingness to sell
their interests in the property for its appraised value at a private sale. Id. at 40. Further, Kelley proposes that only tenants
who own a simple majority of the interests in a tenancy in common should be permitted to seek a judicial sale of the
property. Id. See also Harold A. McDougall, Black Landowners Beware: A Proposal for Statutory Reform, 9 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 127, 135–6 (1980). McDougall proposes that, in certain circumstances, heirs be given the right55
In order to address African American heir-property problems, some proposed changes to the
partition and adverse possession laws would reallocate many rights in the tenancy in common to
the tenants in possession and greatly reduce the rights of the tenants not in possession. For
example, Graber proposes both that a co-tenant in possession be able to constructively oust other
co-tenants after twenty years with the exception of “those who derived their interest by devise or
inheritance from the same source as the claiming co-tenant” and that a co-tenant in possession be
able to force a sale of the interests held by unknown heirs.
353 McDougall proposes, inter alia, that
an heir who has been in possession for a long time be given the right to purchase the property at
a private sale once a partition act is initiated with proceeds of the sale held in escrow for the other
heirs and any unclaimed portion refunded to the purchasing heir in possession.
354 He also proposes
that the adverse possession laws should be changed to make it easier for a tenant in possession to
adversely possess the property against absentee heirs.
355 As part of his proposal that would make
it easier for a tenant in possession to constructively oust a tenant not in possession, McDougall
would permit a tenant in possession to tack the occupancy of the immediate predecessors in title
in order to reduce the amount of time it would take to satisfy the statutory, adverse possession
period.
356
To provide “in” tenants with greater rights at the expense of “out” tenants would benefit rural
African Americans who want to continue to farm agricultural land. Such proposals are, however,
problematic for a number of reasons. First, an overarching problem for many of these proposals
is the lack of individual fairness afforded to certain co-tenants. Requiring that individuals with
vested property rights suffer economic loss in the process of consolidation should be avoided if
there are more just alternatives. Such proposals, moreover, violate a central tenet of international
land-consolidation programs that mandates that individuals should not suffer economic loss in the
process of consolidation.
Second, these proposals do not provide a long-term remedy.
357 For example, under the
constructive ouster proposal, the problems of fractionation will recur if the tenant in possession
dies intestate. Given the overall rate of will-making for both rural African Americans landowners
and other poor rural Americans, this is more likely than not. In addition, vesting a tenant in
possession with the right to force a sale of the property assumes that this tenant may be well
positioned to maintain the property. To the extent that much of heir property has been
underutilized, however, there may be instances in which the tenant in possession elected to remain
in possession in order to live rent-free in a dwelling on the family property due to their poor
financial circumstances. If this person is given the power to force a sale of the property, she could
be susceptible to land speculators who would agree to finance the sale provided that the land is
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transferred immediately thereafter. Even if this tenant in possession could acquire the property for
herself, she may lose the property through foreclosure, tax sale, or distress sale unless her financial
status significantly improves.
Intestacy reform proposals that seek to reduce the further fractionation of heir property may
be unfair to the extent that certain individuals in the ownership group have more restricted options
to pass their property than others. Even absent such fairness concerns, intestacy reform alone
offers too mild an approach to address the magnitude of the heir property problem. For example,
proposals to restrict the class of people eligible to inherit under a will or to restrict the class takes
by the laws of descent will not consolidate the number of tenants in common in a timely or
effective manner.
358 In those instances in which land has become highly fractionated with large
numbers of people holding an interest in the tenancy in common, changes in the laws of inheritance
no matter how far-reaching would not consolidate the number of interests in any reasonable period
of time. The most aggressive intestacy reform proposals allow just one person to inherit the land.
However, resurrecting the law of primogeniture, or some gender-neutral variation, faces the likely
political opposition of the heirs who would lose the right to take under the laws of descent.
359
Primogeniture was rejected in America from the founding as a vestige of feudalism. Given this
historic revulsion, the general public will not likely support a law of primogeniture—even a
modern version designed to promote democratic interests antithetical to feudalism.
360
Existing proposals to ameliorate the heir property problem assume the tenancy in common
as a starting point. Such proposals would improve the status quo by paring down the number of
people with an interest in a given heir-property tract. Some of the worst symptoms of the heir
property problem are addressed by this strategy, including inability to manage land productively
with many remote, passive interest holders and the increased risk of partition action when a tenant
acquires an interest in the common property from a remote heir. The resulting tenancy in common
still would be unstable as any one tenant could seek a partition sale no matter how small an
interest. In addition, these proposals do not help those who remain in the tenancy to better manage
their common property.
A better approach is to restructure the tenancy in common along the lines of newer forms of
ownership such as condominiums/cooperatives or the limited liability company. These have
advantages over tenancies in common or the general partnership form. Allowing those in tenancies
to restructure better balances the goals of strengthening the rights of the common ownership
group and protecting the rights of individuals within the group than other approaches discussed.
The real focus of effective policy reform must be the default rules governing relations amongst
tenants in common by operation of law, that is, not voluntary and consensual communities. Unlike
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tenancies in common formed by voluntary agreement, members of nonconsensual tenancies in
common lack direct control over the formation of the tenancy in common or the composition of
the initial members of the ownership group.
361 Given such uncertainty, in almost all instances, the
prospective “co-tenants by law” cannot preplan their tenancy-in-common relationship by entering
into an agreement that allocates the rights and responsibilities of members prior to the moment that
the law declares them to be tenants in common.
362 Therefore, the moment the tenancy in common
is formed by operation of law, the tenancy in common is most likely to be subject to the default
rules.
363 Theoretically, the members of a nonconsensual tenancy in common can develop a new set
of rules allocating the rights and duties of each co-tenant that would supercede the default rules.
However, negotiating after-the-fact agreements is practically impossible for “co-tenants by law”
because the law requires each of the co-tenants to enter into the agreement.
364 Not only must the
co-tenants by law overcome significant transactions costs in some instances, but also those
individual co-tenants who believe that the default rules benefit them have little incentive to
negotiate away such an advantage without receiving major concessions from their fellow co-
tenants.
365
These obstacles to private ordering become nearly impossible barriers as the number of co-
tenants grows. And this describes many heir-property cases, whether in the rural African American
community or in other communities. Transactions costs may prevent even those holding nearly all
of the interests in any given heir-property parcel to restructure their ownership arrangement by
private management. This suggests that government intervention be required to overcome the
intransigence of individual “holdouts.”
The goal is to allow majorities to act without unanimity but to protect individual interests by
assuring exit from the group as well as fair value for their interest. What follows are two proposals
that could be pursued either independently or as a package. One would require states to spend
little, if any, money; the other more comprehensive proposal would require states to establish land
consolidation courts that would cost some money in the short term, but would be likely to produce
more economically productive landholdings that would benefit the wider economy.
5.2 ALLOW EITHER A MAJORITY OR A SUPERMAJORITY OF THOSE HOLDING
COMMON TENANCY INTERESTS TO RESTRUCTURE AS A LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY
Those who own an interest in heir property are often locked into an ownership structure that
denies them the normal benefits of a fee simple interest. And heir property exacerbates some of
the structural problems of the tenancy in common. The limited liability company, described below,
provides more stability, better mechanisms to allocate management responsibility, and reasonable
exit options as compared to the tenancy in common.
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The limited liability company (“LLC”) was developed for the management of unincorporated
business organizations. Unhappy with the general partnership’s rules concerning vicarious
liability,
366 interest groups representing those in the accounting and legal professions helped in the
1980s to develop and introduce the LLC.
367 Members in LLCs are subject only to limited liability
irrespective of how active a role they play in management, but are taxed as partnerships.
368 These
features have provided businesses organized as general partnerships with incentives to convert
their form of ownership; so many general partnerships have converted that some commentators
have pronounced the general partnership a dead business form.
369 The LLC form is also more
responsive to the interests of the ownership group in maintaining continuity of the business upon
the withdrawal of individual members than the general partnership. A brief comparison of the laws
governing general partnerships and the Delaware LLC statute—chosen because of Delaware’s
historic role in shaping the law of business organizations—is instructive.
A general partnership in many ways, resembles a tenancy in common. Many of the default and
immutable rules governing general partnerships work best for small firms with limited numbers of
partners who know and trust one another.
370 Analogous to each co-tenant’s equal rights to
possession of the whole property, a general partnership consists of partners with equal rights to
the management and profits of the enterprise.
371 As in a tenancy in common, conflicts may arise
between the partners in a partnership if the individual owners contribute substantially different
amounts of money, service, or time to the business.
372 Further, the rules governing the exit of
individual partners from a partnership are almost identical to the common laws rules governing
partition actions. The filing of a partition action by an individual tenant in common usually results
in a judicial sale of the property. In most cases, “any partner can withdraw from the partnership
at will, force a liquidating sale, and receive the net value of her partnership interest in cash.”
373
Although the ability of any individual partner to force a liquidation of a general partnership makes
a general partnership an unstable business form, a general partnership is more stable than a tenancy
in common because partnership default rules prevent partners from transferring their full
partnership interests to third parties without the unanimous consent of the other partners.
374
As compared to the general partnership, LLC statutes allocate more control to the ownership
group than to individual members. At the same time, these statutes protect the economic interests
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of individual members. Examining certain provisions of the Delaware LLC statute demonstrates
the degree to which at least one state legislature sought to reallocate power within unincorporated
business enterprises. Like a corporation, LLCs in Delaware are deemed to have a perpetual
existence unless an operating agreement specifies otherwise.
375 Such continuity of life is normally
unaffected by an individual member’s withdrawal from the entity.
376 In order to dissolve an LLC,
members holding two-thirds of the interests must consent to the dissolution unless the operating
agreement provides otherwise.
377 Although the LLC normally continues after a member resigns
for any reason, such member is entitled to receive fair value for his or her interest as of the date
the membership ceased.
378 However, the LLC also has the unilateral right to acquire the interest
of any member provided that fair value is paid.
379 Like a general partnership, a member may assign
only their financial interest, but not their right to manage an LLC.
380
Just as a member may seek a partition sale of property owned under a tenancy in common,
an LLC may be dissolved upon application of a member or manager if the court determines that
“it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in conformity with a limited liability
company agreement.”
381 Although the specific judicial dissolution provision of the Delaware LLC
statute may appear to allocate a great amount of power to an individual member seeking
liquidation, the overall scheme of the Delaware LLC statute makes it clear that court-ordered
dissolution should be ordered only in unusual circumstances. As indicated above, LLCs are
deemed to have perpetual existence and the default statutory rules require two-thirds of the
members to consent to a dissolution in cases in which a court-ordered dissolution is not sought.
Mechanisms for allocation of management responsibilities within an LLC provide flexibility.
Absent agreement otherwise, decisions are made by those holding more than 50 percent of the
interests in the profits of the company.
382 However, the members of an LLC in Delaware may
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agree to vest complete or partial management of the entity in a manager or managers,
383 or may
establish different classes or groups of members with different voting rights.
384
Interestingly, the Delaware statute includes several provisions that facilitate the ability of
businesses organized under other forms of ownership to convert their ownership to LLC form
(and, for that matter, for LLCs to convert to other forms of ownership). Other enumerated
entities
385 may convert to an LLC by filing a certificate of conversion
386 and a certificate of
formation as an LLC.
387 Prior to converting, however, these other entities must comply with the
rules that govern the preexisting ownership arrangement—including rules that determine what
proportion of members must agree to convert to another form of ownership.
388 Both certificates
are simple in form, requiring limited information such as the names of the entities. In addition,
LLCs may convert to other forms of ownership or may merge or consolidate with other entities
provided more than 50 percent of those holding an interest in the profits of the company agree,
unless the LLC agreement provides otherwise.
389
Limited liability statutes such as the one in Delaware aim to minimize the transactions costs
of converting ownership form, and thus promote the ability of those who own equity jointly to
adapt to changed circumstances. Those businesses not organized as LLCs may easily convert
ownership; LLCs may be easily converted to other forms of ownership. Present state law should
be changed to permit those holding a majority or supermajority of common tenancy interests to
convert to an LLC and to establish the basic framework of the operating agreement. However,
such operating agreements should not permit those vested with management authority to acquire
an interest of an individual member without the consent of such member. In addition, homestead
protections would ensure that those living in a dwelling on property primarily suited for economic
uses retain the right to possession of such dwelling.
390 Though individuals would lose the right to
simply liquidate the ownership at will (by filing for a partition sale, for example), their economic
interests would be protected as they could choose to exit the LLC upon the payment of fair value.
Such revised statutes that would allocate more power to the majority interest holders in a
tenancy in common in order to provide them with more ability to control the disposition and use
of the land do not raise takings issues. Individuals retain their economic interest in the property
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and such interests would likely increase in value. In the past two years, Congress has enacted laws
that now enable the owners of a majority of the undivided interests in Indian allotments located
on either the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation in North Dakota or the former reservations of
several tribes in Oklahoma to enter into mineral leases or agreements.
391 Prior to enactment of
these statutes, all of the interest holders on these Indian lands had to consent to the mineral leasing
agreement.
392 Congress indicated that the Indian owners of the land had suffered significant
economic losses due to the fact that the land had not been able to be explored and developed by
mining companies because of the previous requirement that all of the interest holders consent to
the mining of the land.
393
Assuming for the sake of argument that the conversion of heir property to another form might
raise takings issues, the states clearly have the authority to take such interests because the
Supreme Court has greatly expanded the circumstances under which property may be taken for
a “public use.” In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff,
394 the Supreme Court held that a state
seeking to exercise its powers of eminent domain need demonstrate only that the taking of private
property is rationally related to achieving a public purpose. In addition, the Supreme Court in
Midkiff did not view a taking that would transfer property from one private individual to others
as inconsistent with the public use requirement because the Court determined that “it is not
essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable portion, . . . directly enjoy or
participate in any improvement.”
395 Further, in the unlikely case in which an individual’s interest
would decline in value due to the change in ownership form, such an individual should be entitled
to receive from the ownership group the difference in the value of her interest prior to the
conversion as opposed to the value within a reasonable period of time after the conversion.
5.3 STATES SHOULD ESTABLISH LAND CONSOLIDATION COURTS TO AID RURAL
PROPERTY OWNERS LOCKED IN INEFFICIENT PATTERNS OF OWNERSHIP AND
IMPROVE THE PRODUCTIVITY OF THE LAND BASE
Allowing those holding a majority interest in common property to convert to an ownership form
that allocates more control to the group will stabilize the ownership of such land. Once ownership
is stabilized, many current owners will need to clear title before the land can be used productively.
For example, one of the more insoluble heir-property problems has been the issue of the unknown
heir. Given the existence of these unknown heirs, much of heir property holdings are subject to
clouds on title, rendering it nearly impossible for those holding such property to use the property
as collateral to secure loans to build or improve housing on the land or to improve farming
operations. Even if the majority interest holders could convert the tenancy in common to an LLC,
the unknown heir problem would still need to be addressed in order to provide the known heirs
with clear title. In short, enabling the majority interest holders to convert to an LLC would
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represent just one step in a process of “legal consolidation” that would enable the ownership group
to use the land productively.
In this country, those who own an interest in heir property that has fallen into unproductive
use have few options to improve the prevailing ownership structure, rendering exit through
initiation of partition actions an attractive option.
396 Other countries, in contrast, have developed
institutions that would enable such owners who value the land for more than its mere exchange
value to play a role in improving the ownership structure so that the land could be used more
productively. Norway, for example, has created specific legal institutions that seek to consolidate
land in a manner that is beneficial to all of those who may be affected by such consolidation. These
Norwegian institutions provide a good model that could be replicated in this country with certain
modifications. 
 In the eighteenth century in Norway, as in many other parts of Europe, enclosure resulted
in intense fragmentation of much of the rural land due to successive subdivision practices.
397 After
first enacting significant land consolidation legislation in 1821, the Norwegian philosophy that
drove land consolidation changed from the notion that fragmented landholdings should be
aggregated on a one-time basis to a view that land consolidation “[must be] a continuous process,
constantly readjusting the ownership structure to changing economies, technology and patterns
of land use.”
398 To achieve this end, Norway established a permanent Land Consolidation Service
(“the Service”) in 1859.
399 From the beginning, the Service’s decision-making body was organized
as a court of law; since 1950, these specialized tribunals have been called land consolidation
courts.
400 Currently, throughout the country, there are 41 such district, consolidation “trial” courts
and 5 land-consolidation court of appeals.
401 The land consolidation “judges”(who are not required
to be attorneys) must have a degree from the Agricultural University of Norway with substantive
coursework in land law, surveying, mapping, and land consolidation.
402 In addition, the land
consolidation courts can call upon the expertise of the Service, which employs 275 people, many
with specialized training.
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Land consolidation cases in Norway normally must be initiated by at least one landowner or
person holding a legal interest in the land subject to potential consolidation.
403 The courts use a
two-prong test to determine whether the land may be consolidated. First, there must be a
“dependency of some sort between the holdings in an area, with regard to efficient economic
use.”
404 The “dependency” is defined broadly.
The dependency could be due to location: the holdings are so physically situated in relation to each
other that the use of one affects the use of others, and vica versa (sic). It could also be due to other
physical or practical factors. The dependency could also be rooted in the prevailing type of
ownership from a purely judicial point of view, for instance various sorts of joint (common)
ownership, rights of use and so on.
405
Second, it must be demonstrated that the prevailing ownership structure hinders the current
or potential economic use of the land.
406 The land consolidation courts can design remedies taking
one of two different approaches. First, the judges can attempt to eliminate or minimize the
dependencies. Or the judges can introduce or formalize “rules for cooperation where no such rules
exist, to regulate the dependency, minimizing the disadvantages, maximizing the advantages.”
407
Along the lines of Norway, states with a significant amount of rural farmland should establish
land consolidation services with trained professionals in land use planning, land assessment, and
land consolidation. Such state land-consolidation services should include courts staffed by judges
with legal training (in property, real estate, business organization, and environmental laws)—as
well as substantive training in surveying, mapping (including mapping with high-technology
geographic information systems), and land consolidation. Those who own property in which the
ownership form or physical pattern of tracts limits the productive use of the land may initiate an
action for legal or spatial restructuring. By definition, this would include parcels under fractionated
heir ownership.
Not only the specialized land courts but the land consolidation service generally would assist
those who own heir property. Professionals in the service could, for example, appraise land and
survey land at a cost reflecting ability to pay.
408 Unlike the courts in Norway,
409 the state
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consolidation courts should be vested with the authority to order fractionated tenancies in common
converted into other forms of ownership that are more stable and provide better management
mechanisms with the concurrence of a majority of those holding an interest.
Like the proposal permitting those who own rural, heir property to convert their form of
ownership with less than unanimous consent, the establishment of state land-consolidation courts
would break unproductive ownership patterns weakening the rural land base. Although it is my
concern for the disproportionate impact of rural heir property on African Americans, meaningful
legal reform would strengthen the position of all rural landowners.
5.4 RESTORATION OF LAND THE USDA FORECLOSED UPON OR PROVISION OF
ALTERNATIVE, IN LIEU LAND
The Pigford settlement provided for limited land restoration to black farmers whose land was
foreclosed upon by the Department of Agriculture. Certain farmers who prevail under the more
risky and arduous arbitration procedure set forth in the settlement, the so-called Track B, are
entitled to return of formerly owned property that remains in the USDA inventory.
410 If the USDA
has already transferred the land to a third party, the consent decree provides no other mechanism
for land restoration or, alternatively, for provision of other land. In approving this narrow land-
restoration remedy, the judge reviewing the settlement assumed the federal government has limited
ability to restore land, stating: “[n]othing can . . . restore lost land or lost opportunities to Mr.
Beverly or to all of the other African American farmers.”
411
This is simply not true. Throughout this nation’s history the federal government distributed
land to individuals, states, and private entities with less individualized claims than those of black
farmers who lost land directly resulting from the federal government’s discrimination. For
example, the government allocated huge tracts of federal land to mostly white homesteaders in the
latter part of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century in order to help these
people enter into the economic mainstream of society. Further, the many land-grant universities
throughout the country came into operation only after the federal government provided the
necessary land. In these instances, land in the government’s inventory was transferred in order to
serve specific federal policies.
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The change in federal Indian policy in this century provides further proof that the government
can act to restore land to people who have lost their land unjustly due to discriminatory acts of the
government. In the early part of this century, federal Indian policy sought to assimilate American
Indians, in part by stripping them of much of their land. Modern federal Indian policy aims to
improve the land tenure security for many Indians and tribes, and enables tribes to add to their land
base. From passage of the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934 to the present, American Indian
lands held in trust by the federal government have increased by nearly 8 million acres. These
examples demonstrate that the federal government can, if it chooses, use federal lands to help rural
African Americans stabilize and increase their landholdings. Of course, this would require that the
government adopt a policy that specifically promotes rural African American landownership.
Given the demonstrated significance of African American landownership and the
acknowledged, widespread discriminatory conduct of the USDA, the USDA should return any
formerly black-owned land in its inventory to its prior owners who are members of the Pigford
class. Additionally, the USDA’s inventory obviously includes land that was not foreclosed upon
or land that was foreclosed upon for reasons wholly unconnected to the discriminatory conduct
established in the Pigford lawsuit. Consistent with the charge of the Freedmen’s Bureau to
distribute “abandoned lands,” lands from the USDA’s inventory should be allocated to black
farmers in the Pigford class whose land was foreclosed upon but subsequently transferred to
another party. Such provision of in lieu land would be consistent with land reform measures
adopted by other countries that have attempted to make whole individuals and groups who were
unjustly dispossessed of their land.
412 In short, if the federal government adopted a policy that
recognized the importance of black, rural landownership, land restoration and acquisition could
be assured.
5.5 LEGAL SERVICES ATTORNEYS WITH SPECIALIZED TRAINING SHOULD BE
HIRED TO PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO HEIR PROPERTY OWNERS
Congress should expand the mission of legal services in order that legal services attorneys can
begin providing legal assistance to poor landowners, including those who own an interest in heir
property. Such an expanded mission will necessarily require additional funding for legal services
offices to meet the needs of the newly eligible clients. For example, the local legal services would
need to hire attorneys with training or experience in estate planning, real estate transactions,
property, tax, business organizations, and environmental law.
413 In order to begin building a cadre
of lawyers interested in work with poor, rural landowners, these legal services office should
establish internship programs that allow law students to acquire specific expertise in land-related
cases.
In addition to handling individual cases, these legal services offices should conduct regular
community legal-education workshops to educate poor, rural landowners about the laws that
impact their ability to retain ownership of their land. These workshops could address issues such
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as land records, tax obligations and tax redemption, liens and foreclosure, adverse possession,
mineral, mining, water, and timber rights. The legal services attorneys could also address legal
problems that normally crop up in tenancies in common such as how to allocate responsibility
between co-tenants for costs associated with maintaining the property and how to redeem property
after a tax sale. Further, local community activists (or in some instances landowners themselves)
could be trained to conduct title searches at local county courthouses so that those who own an
interest in land can figure out who else has a claim to the property. There must be continuous
education about the importance of making wills. Legal services offices should develop form wills
that can be modified with little effort. More broadly, such community legal-education programs
could also help rural landowners begin to do financial planning that would help landowners avoid
losing their land—as so many poor, rural landowners have lost their land—due to financial
distress.
5.6 PLACING INTO TRUST AFRICAN AMERICAN HERITAGE LAND
Just as the federal government, the courts, and the general public recognize that certain Indian-
owned ancestral land constitutes a vital part of the American Indian heritage, the federal
government should recognize that there is small amount of rural land still under black
landownership that represents a part of the African American heritage.
414 At a minimum, land
currently owned by African Americans that was initially acquired by black people either prior to
or within a generation of the close of the Civil War should receive special federal protection.
According to a report by the Emergency Land Fund in 1980, there is only a small percentage of
land that was acquired by black people from the close of the Civil War until 1910 that remains in
the families of the original black landowner.
 In addition to this land, land set aside for specific black communities during the New Deal
resettlement programs should be eligible for special federal protection. Although the total number
of rural acres set aside for these black communities was small, these communities served as a
beacon for many rural black people who believed that landownership could transform their lives.
Recently, rural sociologists and other academics have begun to study anew the important role of
these communities in uplifting the hopes of rural African Americans across the South. Given the
unique status of the two categories of land described above, the federal government should
recognize this land as African American heritage land.
415 Owners of such heritage land should be
eligible for federal support that could include financial assistance earmarked to helping restore
historically important buildings on the land, either federal management of the property under a
trust relationship or federal assistance in helping these landowners establish private land trusts, and
the building of museums or archives that would document the history of the acquisition and use
of the land by the black landowners.
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CONCLUSION
At the end of the Civil War, the federal government failed to redistribute land to African
Americans. Without such governmental assistance, many African Americans made heroic sacrifices
to purchase land on their own. However, the 15 million-acre land base that many black families
built up in the South between the end of the Civil War and 1910 has almost been wiped out. In
recent times, thousands of black families have lost their land due to partition sales of black-owned
land, many of which have been initiated by those outside of the family who have managed to
acquire an interest in a tenancy in common with the sole desire of forcing a sale. Although heir
property continues to represent a form of ownership that is especially unstable, those who own
such property find it nearly impossible to reorganize their ownership of land under a form that
provides better mechanisms to foster continued ownership by the group because the law requires
all of the “co-tenants by law” to agree to any change in the default rules governing tenancies in
common.
 Recently, President Clinton has spoken passionately about the threat to the health of our
society by the growing divide in access to technology between those who are more wealthy and
those who are less privileged. The inability of certain groups to participate fully in our society—
and in the global society—due to their inability to access the Internet and other computer
technology represents but one example of a technological divide separating more privileged groups
from others. Those who own heir property are essentially locked into a substandard form of
ownership that presents a large target for those intent on dispossessing people of their land. The
newer forms of ownership that the technology of the law has developed in order to assure greater
continuity of ownership for those owning equity is beyond the reach of those owning heir
property. Just as policymakers should be concerned about providing wider access to computer
technology for all groups in our society, such policymakers should respond to the crisis in land loss
in African American communities given the established links between landownership, community,
and democratic participation.